Measuring ecological validity: a theory-based assessment of ecological validity in community psychology research by Voorhees, Courte C. W.
MEASURING ECOLOGICAL VALIDITY: A THEORY-BASED ASSESSMENT OF 
ECOLOGICAL VALIDITY IN COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY RESEARCH
BY
Courte C. W. Voorhees
Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of Vanderbilt University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
in
Community Research and Action
August, 2009
Nashville, Tennessee
Approved:
Professor Douglas D. Perkins
Professor J. R. Newbrough
Professor Paul W. Speer
To my incredible and heroic wife Danica, without whom most of my ideas would remain 
trapped inside my scull 
and 
To J. R. “Bob” Newbrough, who has been a tireless inspiration, sounding board, and 
cheerleader throughout this and many other projects.
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Many thanks to my chair and advisor, Douglas D. Perkins for his encouragement, 
reflections, and many contributions to the completion of this work. I am also grateful for 
the work and persistence of my readers, J. R. Newbrough and Paul W. Speer; their foot-
prints and coffee rings have shown through in many ways throughout this thesis. 
I am also thankful to James G. Kelly, Donald Klein, and Manuel Riemer for their 
thoughts, support, and encouragement. I am additionally indebted to the attendees at the 
first presentation of many of the ideas herein, who braved my roundtable at the 2007 bi-
ennial of the Society for Community Research and Action.
I am truly thankful for the help of Daniel Cooper and Jonathan Vick for their as-
sistance with this work. Their aid was essential in establishing my instrument and evalua-
tion process. I hope someday to repay their kindness.
I am also eternally grateful to my wife, Danica J. Brice, for her ideas, editing, mo-
tivation, calming voice, and endless cups of tea. Danica is truly the keystone of all things 
I achieve and produce. She is the loving and supportive family that I have always wanted 
and needed.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
DEDICATION.....................................................................................................................ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS................................................................................................iii
LIST OF TABLES.............................................................................................................vii
LIST OF FIGURES..........................................................................................................viii
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................1
Ecological Theory....................................................................................................4
Ecological Validity...................................................................................................8
Application.............................................................................................................10
Measuring Ecological Validity.............................................................................. 12
II. ORIGINS OF ECOLOGY............................................................................................ 14
Historical Origins.................................................................................................. 14
Philosophical Origins............................................................................................ 16
III. CONTRIBUTING SCHOOLS IN ECOLOGY...........................................................19
Social Ecology....................................................................................................... 19
Developmental Psychology....................................................................................24
Environmental Psychology.................................................................................... 25
Community Psychology..........................................................................................29
IV. ECOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES ADAPTED TO COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY.... 36
Interdependence.....................................................................................................37
Adaptation..............................................................................................................38
Succession..............................................................................................................38
Cycling................................................................................................................... 39
Entropy...................................................................................................................41
Centripetal Versus Centrifugal Focus................................................................... 43
Diversity Versus Homogeneity...............................................................................46
iv
V. MARKERS OF ECOLOGICAL VALIDITY IN COMMUNITY RESEARCH......... 48
Theoretical Underpinnings.................................................................................... 48
Current Methods and Methodology in Community Psychology............................ 49
VI. ECOLOGICAL METHODS....................................................................................... 53
Statistical Multi-level Modeling (MLM)................................................................ 54
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM)....................................................................55
Social Network Analysis (SNA)..............................................................................57
Deep Qualitative Methods..................................................................................... 59
Behavior Settings Research................................................................................... 62
Participatory Action Research (PAR)....................................................................64
Geographic Information Systems (GIS).................................................................68
Dynamic Modeling.................................................................................................69
VII. EVALUATING COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY RESEARCH.............................. 72
Sampling................................................................................................................ 72
The Ecological Validity Instrument....................................................................... 73
Structure of Evaluation: The X Axis...................................................................... 74
Structure of Evaluation: The Y Axes......................................................................76
VIII. RESULTS................................................................................................................. 81
Levels..................................................................................................................... 82
Processes................................................................................................................83
Methods..................................................................................................................84
Comparisons and Correlations..............................................................................84
Representation of Ecological Validity Elements....................................................85
Between-Journal Comparisons..............................................................................87
IX. DISCUSSION..............................................................................................................88
Caveats...................................................................................................................88
Levels..................................................................................................................... 89
Processes................................................................................................................91
Methods..................................................................................................................93
The Big Picture...................................................................................................... 95
X. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................97
v
Appendix
A. ECOLOGICAL LEVELS (EXPANDED)....................................................................99
B. ECOLOGICAL VALIDITY INSTRUMENT............................................................ 100
C. SAMPLED RESEARCH LITERATURE...................................................................101
REFERENCES................................................................................................................ 104
vi
LIST OF TABLES
Table                                                                                                                               Page
1. Levels of Ecological Topography in the Research Process........................................... 82
2. Ecological Processes......................................................................................................83
3. Methods Used and Consulted in the Research Process................................................. 84
4. Comparisons and Correlations.......................................................................................85
5. Representation of Ecological Elements by Standard Deviation.................................... 86
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure                                                                                                                            Page
1. Expanded ecological levels (Adapted from Bronfenbrenner 1979)………………….99
viii
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Ecological theory – an oft-neglected tenet of community psychology (CP) – is 
central to the conceptualization of community issues. Although ecological theory has 
been increasingly elaborated since Kelly (1968), few attempts have been made to 
significantly expand adherence to ecological theory -- making accountability to 
ecological validity scarce. Moos (1976) reminds us that an integrated perspective of 
humans in their environment is central for behavioral, social, and biological sciences. 
Systems must be seen as integrated wholes – wherein all parts and aspects are 
interdependent. A change in one element of a system will change other elements, perhaps 
unintentionally or invisibly (Jager & Slotnick, 1982); immediate and proximal gains may 
cause long-term, distal harm – thus ecological thinking is intrinsically sensitive to 
temporal and spatial dimensions of change. 
There is often a disconnect in community psychology between ecological theory 
and the use of methods that adequately capture ecological context (Luke, 2005). 
Traditional methods available in the social sciences – especially psychology – are 
designed to capture individual level data or aggregates of single level data; thus, using 
these methods is problematic for researchers trying to capture the relevant ecological 
variables in a system. Luke (2005) states that, “…the decisions we make about the tools 
we use in community science say something about the values we hold as community 
scientists” (p. 187). Traditional statistical methods like ANOVA, regression, 
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psychometrics, correlation, and categorical statistics – used more commonly in CP than 
contextual methods (Luke, 2005) – can be utilized to measure and understand multiple 
levels of an ecology, but methods designed specifically to do so are a better match to 
ecological theory and lead to the evolution of ecological methodology. Regardless of 
which tools are used, methods are an essential element on the path from ecological theory 
to empirical systems knowledge.
There are myriad theoretical and practical reasons why an integrated ecological 
perspective has not been more widely adopted. One major reason is its complexity; Keller 
and Golley (2000) note that the complexity of the ecological perspective is its greatest 
strength, although this complexity makes it harder to incorporate into theory, research, 
and action. Ecology is heralded as a response to the ills of industrialism specifically 
because it takes the complexity of systems into account. Second, traditions in research 
emphasize and reward contrived, individualized, behaviorally oriented work; in 1963, 
Roger Barker noted that, “[p]sychology has been so busy selecting from, imposing upon, 
and rearranging the behavior of its subjects that it has until very recently neglected to 
note behavior's clear structure when it is not molested by tests, experiments, 
questionnaires and interviews” (p.24). Another reason is that there has never been a 
comprehensive accumulation of ecological elements necessary to evaluate ecological 
validity, nor any means of measuring these elements. This thesis follows a path from 
ecological theory to a concrete instrument for measuring ecological validity.
Beginning with an introduction to ecological theory, an explanation of ecological 
validity, and a brief history of ecological thought, I examine the adaptation of the 
ecological perspective to community psychology and then outline several additional 
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ecological concepts that add significantly to understanding community phenomena from 
an ecological perspective. I then develop an evaluative framework to determine 
ecological validity in a systematic and comparable way. A sample from published 
community psychology research articles that claim to be conceptualized, executed, or 
applied ecologically are evaluated with this framework to determine the status quo of 
ecological validity in the field of community psychology. As a core theoretical 
contributor to community psychology, it is essential that ecological tenets be 
systematically applied to increase research validity and to further inform the ecological 
paradigm through empirical testing. Although a commonly used heuristic device for the 
conceptualization of behaviors, pathologies, and research triangulation, social ecological 
theory has not been comprehensively cataloged, applied, or tested. Moos (1976) made 
admirable attempts, noting the following:
The arrangement of environment is probably the most powerful technique 
we have for influencing behavior... every institution in our society sets up 
conditions that it hopes will maximize certain types of behavior and 
certain directions of personal growth... There is, of course, serious 
disagreement about which effects should be maximized and which 
environmental conditions should maximize them. (p. 4)
A theory’s heuristic ability is essential, but without rigorous testing and applied 
methodology, it will remain academic speculation. This thesis will evaluate the 
ecological validity of community psychology research, create a tool for evaluation of 
future research, provide direction for increasing ecological validity, and present means 
for the systematic and continued testing of ecological theory.
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Ecological Theory
Since the 1930’s, psychology has been adapting the model and principles of 
natural ecology to better understand human behavior and pathology (Dunham, 1940). 
Although Kurt Lewin struggled throughout his career to bridge the cognitive dissonance 
between his ecological views and his more rigid views of science and psychology, his 
pioneering work set the stage for the integrative work of other theorists and researchers 
(Barker, 1963). The adaptation of ecology to human circumstances, often referred to as 
human ecology or social ecology, assumes that there is continuity between all people and 
their environments and seeks to understand the development of community and society 
from a transactional perspective (Hawley, 1950). This development came at a time when 
field biologists left humans out of their thinking and sociologists had shied away from 
systems thinking (Barker, 1963). 
Much like natural ecology, human and social ecology attempt to understand the 
inhabitants, structure, change, and development of a particular setting with the 
assumption that all of these elements are connected and cannot be abstracted from one 
another without the loss of important information (Hawley, 1950). Ecological theory 
attempts to take all relevant units of analysis into account, exploring often-disregarded 
foci. Since these units are often not representative of individuals or tangible objects 
traditionally measured in research, they are difficult to observe and measure – although 
extremely important in tracing ecological relationships. Ecological theory is not 
universally accepted, but has remained a constant and useful system of concepts for 
understanding the human condition. Ecological thinking rightfully pervades almost all 
aspects of community inquiry, granting a unified vision for the study of phenomena of 
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concern to the community psychologist. Capra (1982) captures the core and future of 
ecological thought succinctly:
[This] new vision of reality… is based on awareness of the essential 
interrelatedness and interdependence of all phenomena – physical, biological, 
psychological, social, and cultural. It transcends current disciplinary and 
conceptual boundaries and will be pursued within new institutions. At present 
there is no well-established framework, either conceptual or institutional, that 
would accommodate the formulation of the new paradigm, but the outlines of 
such a framework are already being shaped by many individuals, communities, 
and networks that are developing new ways of thinking and organizing 
themselves according to new principles (p. 265).
Interdisciplinarity and research dialectics – as described by Capra (1982) – unclog 
disciplinary stagnation and lead to better research and resource efficiency (Bry, Hirsch, 
Newbrough, Reischl, & Swindle, 1990). We require greater recognition of this “social 
system complexity” (Gross, 1966, p. 178); instead of linear thinking we must think in 
terms of multiple feedback loops as the interrelation within complex and dynamic 
systems, coupled feedback within cooperating and or competing systems, and 
feedforward loops which are based on reciprocal expectations of future behavior (Gross, 
1966). 
Keller and Golley (2000) outline six components of the ecological worldview – 
synonymous with ecology – which emphasize the interaction and connectedness between 
all things: 1) Ontological interconnectedness: All biotic and abiotic things are integral 
parts of the biosphere; 2) Internal relations: The identity and essence of any thing is an 
expression of interrelationships and context; 3) Holism: To understand a part or the 
whole of the biosphere, the relationships between parts must be understood, rather than 
merely the parts; 4) Naturalism: All life forms, including humans, result from the same 
natural processes; 5) Nonanthropocentrism: Due to interconnectedness, non-human 
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elements of the biosphere have more than instrumental value/utility; 6) Human damage: 
Humans have caused severe negative impacts through pollution and extinction, making 
environmental ethics necessary.
More than mere theoretical musing, ecology offers a synthesis of the dialogical 
relationships existing between otherwise artificially separated elements. This synthesis 
has the ability to make science and inquiry more relevant (Cornwall & Jewkes, 1995). 
Odum (2000) demonstrates the need for ecologically designed research in order to 
capture emergent properties and understand the energy flow and budget of living 
systems. These emergent properties exist in natural biology and in human systems. 
Without ecologically valid research, the piecemeal study of parts will never see emergent 
qualities (Odum, 2000). In order for psychologists to leave the laboratory and find 
emergent system properties they must use the methods and data of other disciplines (e.g., 
climatologists, geologists, geographers, anthropologists, sociologists, etc.), essentially an 
interdisciplinary approach (Sells, 1974); natural phenomena are too dynamic for a single 
researcher operating in a single discipline to capture. Synthesizing observed elements is 
not just an interdisciplinary pursuit requiring collaboration between previously discrete 
fields of study, but integration within single minds (Campbell, 1969). The move toward 
ecological research not only lies in methods and ecologies, but in the evolution of 
researcher's minds, world-views, and collaborative abilities.
Many researchers (even ecologically-minded ones) utilize tools designed for 
experimental, positivist research and adapt them as best they can to their contextual 
methodology. Barker (1978a) explores this contradiction further:
One of the purposes of experimental techniques is to arrange the data that issue 
from data-generating systems so they will fit prevailing machines, formulae, and 
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concepts. So we have forced-choice tests, five-point scales, normalized 
distributions, equated control groups, and so on. These are not sins. They facilitate 
the purposes of experiments: to solve problems and test hypotheses that the 
investigators bring to the data. But if one's intention is to explore behavior and its 
environment, the phenomena themselves must dictate the choices, the scales, and 
the distributions. It is our experience that psychological measurement experts do 
not know statistical and analytical techniques for dealing with 'natural' 
phenomena, even where they are available from other sciences. We need 
mathematical innovators and we need textbooks and handbooks on data-reduction 
methods culled from quantitative botany, demography, geography, physiology, 
and economics. When those who work on eco-behavioral problems do not have 
the analytical tools they need, they inevitably cast data in the molds of 
experimental psychology, molds that often destroy the essential nature of the 
phenomena they are investigating. (p.46)
Ecological theory is also used as a framework to determine the sites and methods 
for triangulation of research results. Triangulation logically and statistically compares 
multiple measures to increase the validity of results (Bryman, 1984; Morse, 2003). 
Triangulation can enhance the generalizability of research, allowing the application of 
theory and methods to other settings (Marshall & Rossman, 1995). An ecological 
perspective is an ideal lens to build a triangulated methodology; ecological perspectives 
naturally contain the elements necessary for combined methods (Rank, 2004), revealing 
complimentary routes to inquiry, additional – and likely novel – insights into the research 
focus, increased validity due to contextual understanding, and the most complete vantage 
for understanding inconsistent or contradictory data. Barker and Pistrang (2005) explicate 
and critique another model of triangulation called Methodological Pluralism that benefits 
from ecological thinking. Pluralism embraces the many relevant possible methodological 
avenues for exploring phenomena (Barker & Pistrang, 2005), which is highly congruent 
with ecological methodology.
Ecological theory asks the researcher to do more than change their view of 
observed phenomena, but also requires them to examine their place within the ecological 
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topography of what they observe. This poses more than methodological difficulties if one 
understands one's immersion into a larger ecological topography. Most researchers have 
traditionally abstracted themselves from the research process. Those who do reflect upon 
their position find themselves with more power, prestige, and resources than research 
participants (Babbie, 2005). This is not only difficult to rectify, but also difficult to face 
as a conscientious researcher. Ecological thinking also takes into account the 
complexities of the researcher’s standpoint, as well as the complex nature of what they 
observe. Following the behavioral-ecology model of Jager and Slotnick (1982), 
ecological research, “...represents a merging of ethics and practice, as it espouses 
relatively specific values to inform action” (p. 11). Because researchers often have 
personal connections with the settings they observe – a fact that is usually ignored or 
unacknowledged by traditional research – many ecologically-minded researchers engage 
in more participatory and action focused research to act out their values and connections 
with contexts of interest.
Ecological Validity
The term ecological validity has been used in psychological literature almost as 
long as ecological theory has been a part of psychology. The way that ecological validity 
was defined in psychological articles before the 1970s would be almost unrecognizable to 
modern community psychologists. Although the term existed previously in the literature, 
Bronfenbrenner (1979) popularized and redefined ecological validity into the concept 
familiar to community psychology literature. Ecological validity is defined by 
Bronfenbrenner (1979) as “…the extent to which the environment experienced by the 
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subjects in a scientific investigation has the properties it is supposed or assumed to have 
by the investigator (p. 29).” This definition has almost always been applied to 
experimental settings not commonly used in community inquiry. Reppucci (1990) holds 
that, “...there is no agreed-upon definition of ecological validity ...” (p. 160) and believes 
that ecological validity is embraced by many community psychologists in the abstract but 
is adhered to by very few. Reppucci (1990) also states that ecological validity combines 
multiple and ongoing interactions at multiple ecological levels and applies the study of 
people or groups in natural contexts rather than contrived settings – differing from 
Bronfenbrenner's (1979) emphasis on more traditional developmental research and 
laboratory experiments. These differences may spring from the status quo of ecological 
validity at the time of publication – as ecological thought had expanded significantly 
from 1979 to 1990. The definition of ecological validity has – for pragmatic reasons – 
expanded in community psychology far beyond laboratory and contrived experimental 
settings. Also, analogous to Newbrough's (1995) Third Position, ecological researchers 
must move beyond the position of purely imbedded community member or objective, 
abstracted researcher to a reflective synthesis of the two – or “reflective-generative 
practice” (p. 25). Kingry-Westergaard and Kelly (1990) add that, “[t]he ecological 
approach focuses on the behavior of persons in social settings related to the social 
construction that the participants, both observer and observed, create of their own 
context” (p.28). This means that a truly ecological perspective applies to research 
phenomena and the researcher's context. Additionally, Christens and Perkins (2008) note 
the importance of the temporal aspects of context, extending impact on research to 
impact from research. When tracking environmental elements – both elements 
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contributing to and resulting from the research process – ecologically valid research 
should move beyond capturing psychological, social, and imagined environments to 
actual real-world elements of a system. Including these important new elements, a 
comprehensive definition of ecological validity has been devised: Ecological validity is  
the extent to which the research process assesses the relevant environmental elements 
and processes affecting the phenomena and/or participants of focus, the extent to which 
the researchers assess their own power and position within the ecological topography of  
the research environment, and the extent to which the researchers assess the inherent  
and potential ecological impact of the research process and results.
Application
Contextually minded application of research can yield ecological validity over 
and above the process of research itself. Whether publication, policy change, best 
practice, consciousness raising, etc., there are many aims for research in community 
psychology. Each of these research aims has effects on various levels of the ecological 
topography of the participants and community. Beyond the participants, research can 
have far-reaching effects on similar communities, as well as unknown effects. 
Community researchers have the responsibility to weigh the ecological impact of their 
work, with a mind to maximize the potential positive impacts and minimize negative 
impacts through the application of their research and its results. Although it can be 
argued that having the least possible impact on a setting is most ecologically sensitive (as 
is valued in field biology), significant impacts on people, neighborhoods, and 
communities already exist due to government, commercial, and social forces that have no 
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interest in minimizing their impact. These forces are no more or less “natural” than 
research interventions and often impinge upon community conditions without significant 
opposition from actors sensitive to the well-being of the community and its inhabitants. 
The following conceptual model can be used to track the ecological connections between 
the researcher and his or her environment.
By tracking the ecological impact of the research input, process, and output 
(IPO), a more complete vision of ecological validity can be obtained. It is not enough to 
merely create a generalizable research setting; the researcher is responsible to the 
participants, their community, and their society. The IPO model first looks at the relevant 
levels of the ecological topography that have influenced the setting of research. The level 
of research conceptualization, data collection, analysis, and phenomena may differ, with 
significant consequences if these levels are mismatched (Shinn, 1990). It is important for 
these levels to be intentionally maximized for their purpose – even if they are not all 
present at all levels. Certain research questions may pragmatically require emphasis at 
some levels of an ecology at the expense of others, due to resources, methods, or access; 
necessary depth of research to achieve pragmatic ends certainly cannot be sacrificed to 
reach greater breadth of ecological validity for its own end. Then the research process 
must be examined to determine the place of the research itself and the researcher amid 
the ecological topography of the setting. Researchers – whether in the academy, 
organizations, corporations, or government agencies -- may have more power than whole 
communities, so their position cannot be abstracted from their surroundings. The walls of 
the university or government office do not insulate researchers from affecting the world; 
they likely only insulate the researcher from feeling the effects. Lastly – as outlined 
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previously – the output of the research is examined. What are the intrinsic effects of the 
research on the ecology and what are the potential effects of the research. A researcher’s 
ability to track these impacts increases the ecological validity in great measure.
Analogous to the IPO model, temporal and conceptual qualities of research can be 
traced from their research conceptualization (see Katz and Kahn, 1978), their 
measurement of antecedents, their action or intervention, and their evaluation of the 
impact or outcomes of the research process. These categories will be elaborated later and 
are used for the measurement of ecological validity.
Measuring Ecological Validity
Ecological and environmental models for behavior emerged in part due to 
frustration with personality models' inability to predict behavior across multiple milieus 
and with varied criterion of validity (Moos, 1973). Therefore, developing environmental 
and ecological models is an important part of the ongoing process of understanding, 
predicting, and changing behavior. Ecological validity can be tracked in every process of 
research and lends a critical lens to understand the context of behavior. Within this thesis, 
the guiding theory, methods, methodology, and application of community psychology 
research will be evaluated using markers based in major theoretical publications in the 
field, as well as adaptations proposed in this paper. The creation of an evaluative 
framework and the following application of the instrument aim to answer the following 
questions: a) What are the essential components of ecological validity? b) Can ecological 
validity be effectively measured? c) How ecologically valid is community psychology 
research? d) How can the ecological validity of research be raised?
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These questions can best be answered by turning to the roots of ecological 
thinking and tracing those threads to contemporary research. This process highlights the 
context and progress of theoretical and empirical steps that have occurred and still may 
be reached. It also highlights some of the pitfalls of applying ecological theory to our 
research and values.
Due to the exploratory nature of this research, there is no benchmark of ecological 
validity with which to compare results. Although this may seem to diminish quantitative 
possibilities, the intent of this work is not to set a normative standard for levels of 
ecological validity; this research will provide a baseline for comparison, a starting point 
for a path of increased validity, and, most importantly, a tool for planning ecologically 
valid research. It is not assumed that a single article or research project can reach 
“maximum” ecological validity, but rather, in the tradition of Campbell (1969), I hope 
that this paper allows researchers in pursuit of ecological research to coordinate their 
efforts within and across research efforts to attain greater understanding of systems and 
system change.
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CHAPTER II
ORIGINS OF ECOLOGY
Historical Origins
The term ecology is derived from the Greek words oikos, meaning household, and 
logos, connoting reason or meaning – adapted in science to express the systematic search 
for meaning (Miller, 2000). The first known use of the word is by the German biologist 
Ernst Haeckel, who originally coined the term as oekologie in 1866 (Milner, 1993). 
Haeckel was an ardent follower of Charles Darwin, spreading the message of evolution 
science with religious zeal. The tenets of Darwinism, especially the focus on 
environmental effects on organisms, played well into ecological thinking. Unfortunately, 
Haeckel’s creation of ecology did not keep him from falling prey to a common folly of 
Darwinists; Haeckel pioneered Social Darwinism and Eugenics as a solution to many of 
Society’s ills. In the end, the predictor of the existence of Java Man and the pioneer of 
ecological theory denied the influence of context on individuals and groups that he 
deemed to be inferior (Milner, 1993).
To further define ecology, the difference between geography and ecology is 
defined by McKenzie (1982) as the difference between place and process – 
geographically speaking, location signifies position on the earth's surface while 
ecologically speaking, location signifies position within a spatial (or, I would add, 
relational) grouping of interacting and related humans or human institutions. This 
interrelation has been expanded since McKenzie (1982) – due to technology, 
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globalization, and our understanding of the boundaries of influence for humans and 
human activity. Still, between Park's (1982) process orientation (among others) and 
McKenzie's (1982) relational-spatial orientation, the ecological perspective takes on the 
form of a dynamic view of humans in context.
As in Haeckel’s case, many scientists have denied the importance of ecology 
beyond the study of non-human organisms and their surrounding environment for the 
advancement of biology. Although adopted simplistically for early environmental 
movements, humans were kept out of the natural ecology picture (and in many cases still 
are) until the Chicago School of Sociology began creating a unified ecology that included 
humans in the existing ecological theory available at the time (see the Social Ecology 
section later in this paper). Beyond the new social ecology of the Chicago School, 
Norwegian philosopher and mountaineer Arne Naess introduced the concept of deep 
ecology in 1972. Deep ecology posits a model of ecology that imbeds humans as merely a 
part of ecology – equal in value to other biota at best – not a unique and separate observer 
of natural processes (Naess, 1976/1989). This position includes knowledge of – and 
responsibility for – every element and process of the Earth, without regard for its 
importance to humanity (Naess, 1976/1989) – often relegating humans and their eco-
meddling to near virus status. 
Murray Bookchin's (2003) social ecology (further outlined in the Social Ecology 
section in this paper) scathingly rejects the position of deep ecology, as it ignores the 
social and hierarchical roots of ecological crises. Bookchin (2008) rails that, “[t]he very 
words 'deep ecology' clue us into the fact that we are not dealing with a body of clear 
ideas, but with an ideological toxic dump” (p. 244). Bookchin (2008) asserts that humans 
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are a part of ecological evolution – but are set apart by our ability for reflection and our 
ability to create culture. Bookchin (2008) further denigrates Naess by stating that, 
“...deep ecology is the fast food of quasi-radical environmentalists” (p. 248). Whether 
holding the extreme view of deep ecology, the position of pure social scientist, or 
somewhere in between, researchers are part of what they observe and must act 
accordingly with sensitivity to the interconnectedness and worth of the entire biosphere.
Philosophical Origins 
The origins of scientific philosophy are also the origins of reductionistic and anti-
ecological thinking. White (1998) notes that Aristotelian deus ex machina places God as 
the first efficient cause of the universe, removing the divine from the continuing 
processes and materials of the earth. Thus, the mind (a la Descartes) is outside the body 
(ego ex machina) and the quest to become godlike for humans makes them strive to 
separate from the earth and their own body. This removes the dynamic praxis of being in 
the world and in one's body – thus leading to a lack of respect and connectedness. 
Tracing scientific philosophy from its origins, Altman and Rogoff (1987) outline 
four perspectives in science that can be seen as a stepwise evolution in scientific 
philosophy. These perspectives are: a) Trait, b) Interactional, c) Organismic, and d) 
Transactional. Each perspective is examined in the following passages: 
Trait. The trait perspective is based on essentialism and stability. From this 
perspective, any object or organism has an unchanging and stable essence. A person or 
thing is unchangeable and scientific inquiry should be to understand its essence, rather 
than to understand or promote change. The only viable unit of analysis is individual 
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objects and organisms. Much of pre-Copernican science was conducted from the trait 
perspective.
Interactional. The interactional perspective is based on separate, discrete 
interacting pieces. From this perspective, objects and organisms are unchanging and 
stable, but the interactions between them yield scientifically meaningful information. The 
units of analysis in the interactional perspective are individual objects and organisms and 
simple relationships based on physical measurable properties. An example of the 
interactional perspective is Newtonian physics.
Organismic. The organismic perspective is based on holism and development. 
Objects and organisms are seen as developing entities existing within a changing context. 
Biotic and abiotic entities and elements are constantly changing and interacting with their 
environment. Phenomena and elements of a system cannot be abstracted from their 
context without changing their properties. The units of analysis in the organismic 
perspective are individual objects and organisms, complex relationships between 
different entities, and the discrete systems that include these elements. Non-contemporary 
ecology and Darwinian biology are examples of organismic perspectives.
Transactional. The transactional perspective is based on aspects of complex 
systems. Objects and organisms are seen as parts of transcendent relationships without 
boundaries that are constantly interacting and developing. From the transactional 
perspective biotic and abiotic elements are an ever-changing part of numerous cycles. 
Relationships between elements – including sub-elements and energy – are just as viable 
as objects or people for study. The units of analysis for the transactional perspective are 
individual objects and organisms, complex relationships between different entities, 
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discrete and continuous systems, temporal qualities, psychological properties, and the 
transcendent qualities of systems of all sizes. Capra (1996) describes these qualities 
succinctly: 
Their essential, or ‘systematic,’ properties are properties of the whole, which none 
of the parts have. They arise from the ‘organizing relations’ of the parts—that is, 
from a configuration of ordered relationships…Systemic properties are destroyed 
when a system is dissected into isolated elements. (p. 36)
Contemporary ecology is based in the transactional science perspective. Ecological 
theory originated in – and potentially co-generated – the organismic science perspective. 
The transactional science perspective is synonymous with ecological theory. Altman and 
Rogoff (1987) make no direct value judgment on one perspective over another, but note 
that most of modern science operates within the organismic perspective at best. Since 
each successive perspective essentially contains the units of analysis found in the 
previous, the transactional science perspective would yield the most information with the 
most triangulation. Pragmatically, it is extremely impractical and improbable that 
researchers adopt methodology purely reflecting the transactional perspective. As 
science, theory, and technology progress, transactional science will become more 
practical and possible – although many factors other than validity and practicality govern 
the path of scientific investigation (Kuhn, 1996). As knowledge builds, researchers can 
continue testing transactional ecological models while utilizing ideal, full-scale 
ecological theory as a guiding frame of reference.
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CHAPTER III
CONTRIBUTING SCHOOLS IN ECOLOGY
Social Ecology
Moos (1976) asserts that no clearly defined criteria exist for an ideal environment, 
especially considering divergent requirements. Although nomothetic principles are 
difficult to pin down, Moos (1976) outlines a specific value orientation when defining 
social ecology's mission as he sees it:
... a social ecological approach has an explicit value orientation: it is not simply 
an approach for science. It is also a humanistic approach from which to benefit 
mankind. A social ecological approach is dedicated to increasing the amount of 
control individuals have over their environments, and to the question of how 
environmental planners can plan environments and still avoid acting as agents of 
social control. It is dedicated to increasing individual freedom of choice in 
selecting environments. (p. 31)
Human ecology differs from natural ecology in several ways. First, humans are 
not as directly dependent on nature (at least nature not manipulated by humans) – as the 
relationship is mediated through other humans, due to local and global divisions of labor. 
Humans have also greatly increased their ability to act upon their environment, changing 
the character of what nature means. Structure in nature is determined by biology, 
physiology, etc. (Park, 1982) making humans appear different from other biota in that we 
assume that the structures of our society and world are determined by something that 
transcends biology. Bookchin (2008) still asserts that, “[t]he human species, in effect, is 
no less a product of natural evolution and differentiation than blue-green algae” (p. 251), 
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but we have specifically and instrumentally evolved to build culture and reflect on our 
existence.
Burgess (1982) also notes that social organization and social disorganization are 
analogous to metabolism – as seen in growth rates, acculturation into the “body” of a 
city, social problems as “disease,” etc. Human society is a structure or organization of 
control – directing the energy of its inhabitants. This may lessen competition and increase 
cooperation (Park, 1982), likely in order to increase competition (and decrease 
cooperation) with other species.
Moos (1974) outlines six approaches in methodology for studying human 
environments according to the social ecology perspective: (1) search for objective 
ecological variables by which environments may be classified (e.g., geographical, 
meteorological, architectural), (2) behavior settings, (3) organizational structure (e.g., 
size, faculty-student ratio, span of control), (4) describe the average background 
characteristics of individuals functioning in a certain environment (e.g., intelligence, 
mechanical ability), (5) psychosocial characteristics and organizational climate, (6) 
identifying reinforcement contingencies that maintain particular behaviors (functional 
analysis of environment). This comprehensive set of steps can certainly be utilized in 
community research to achieve greater ecological validity.
As evidenced by its fall from grace in sociology, social ecology and the 
ecological metaphor – at least, as asserted by the Chicago School – has gaps and flaws 
worthy of attention. The problem for ecologically minded researchers, theorists and 
practitioners can be summed up by Hollingshead's (1982) position that while humans are 
animals in nature, they are also a possessor of culture in a society – unlike any other 
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animal (we presume). This makes a direct, simple translation of natural ecology and field 
biology into human ecology a mistake. The human ecologists of the Chicago School 
projected the ecological metaphor to its reductio ad absurdum by assuming that ecologies 
are stable and should not be modified from their “natural” paths – leading toward the 
assumption that social change efforts are unnatural and doomed to failure.
According to Parson (2005), the Chicago School of sociology utilized natural 
ecology to espouse social Darwinism by stating that the poor fit their environment and 
gentrification is a natural process. This led the Chicago School to take the position that 
intervention to promote individual or community well-being went against the natural 
order of human ecologies and that cities are, “impervious to social reform” (Parson, 
2005, p. 4). Unfortunately, the pioneers of ecological theory in the Chicago School 
ignored or misinterpreted one of the more important tenets of ecological theory, called 
the disturbance hypothesis, that assumes local equilibriums can and will be disrupted by 
forces existing in higher levels of nested ecological systems. In a non-human system, this 
“disturbance” might be a natural disaster (e.g., fire, earthquake, flood, etc.), mass 
migration, drought, or even human intervention. Each of these (and myriad other) 
disruptions can cause major changes to local equilibrium, resulting in new death, new 
life, and the potential for a stronger ecosystem. These disruptions affect human 
ecosystems as well, but other more uniquely human disruptions exist as well (and could 
be adapted to urban and social theory); border conflicts, changes in immigration laws, 
rapid gentrification, closed factories and mines, etc. can have serious effects on 
community equilibrium, while intentional disruptions like government unemployment 
programs, housing trust funds, faith-based hunger prevention, new education projects, 
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etc. have made major changes and still hold the promise of improving communities 
through the disruption of negative ecological trends. This theory does not denounce the 
order that can exist in a system; Barker's (1963) empirical work shows surprising 
amounts of self-organization and direction within settings – but such stability must not be 
seen as the only natural state for a system. 
Hawley (1982) notes that social (or human) ecology also stalled intellectually due 
to isolation from related disciplines, clinging to particular concepts beyond their 
usefulness, and concept competition. Interdisciplinarity (and eventually, 
transdisciplinarity) is an important step toward relieving the binds that left human 
ecology in the past for sociology. Another weakness in social ecology noted by Hawley, 
(1982) is the assumption that consciousness and nature must be separated; to look for 
behavioral cause only outside of consciousness denies that consciousness is part of 
human nature. Ecological concepts must be applied in a more complex manner to sentient 
beings, rather than swept aside or applied in small-minded ways.
It is unfortunate that human ecological theorists and researchers from the Chicago 
School did not more fully understand natural ecology (or human's relationship with 
ecological connections) or this conclusion would have been avoided. Cultural context 
adds unique features to the human condition not accounted for in natural ecology. To 
ignore cultural context in favor of a biological one will never create satisfactory results 
and will nullify the adapted theory. Therefore, theory must be adapted into uniquely 
human terms, tested through action, then dynamically modified to create satisfactory 
human ecological theory. Additionally, the disturbance hypothesis accounts for social 
change quite elegantly and has been widely accepted in natural ecology. Disturbances 
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can actually lead to more diverse and stronger systems, as long as the disturbance is 
strong enough to prevent the development of dominance and not sufficient to cause 
regional destruction (Walker, 1989).
Bookchin's social ecology. Bookchin (2003) sees social ecology as a rational and 
coherent form of naturalism that avoids quasi-religious and positivist dogma (often found 
in biocentric views like deep ecology). Bookchin (2008) asserts that social ecology 
should critically unmask hierarchy and should be morally humanistic (while not degraded 
to humanism) – rather than misusing ecological concepts to further an unjust status quo. 
The mis-utilization of ecological concepts by ruling classes and academics should not be 
used as arguments against ecological thinking (Bookchin, 2008). In contrast to other 
traditions springing from natural ecology, Bookchin (2008) further delineates social 
ecology:
Social ecology accepts neither a “biocentricity” that essentially denies or degrades 
the uniqueness of human beings, human subjectivity, rationality, aesthetic 
sensibility, and the ethical potentiality of humanity, nor an “anthropocentricity” 
that confers on the privileged few the right to plunder the world of life, including 
human life. Indeed, it opposes “centricity” of any kind as a new word for 
hierarchy and domination... (p. 250).
The social Darwinism and Malthusian thinking that has arisen from the Chicago 
School and biocentric ethics is truly flawed if it does not take social hierarchy and 
economic structures into account; the fact that capitalism's emphasis on – and success 
with – unlimited growth means that reduction in population would not lead to diminished 
levels of production and resource use (Bookchin, 2003). Bookchin's (2008) social 
ecology celebrates the diversity and individuation of humans as the transformative 
process necessary to remake society and arrest the growth of totalitarian, anti-ecological 
trends in human society. Bookchin (2008) reminds us that, “[t]he primary question 
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ecology faces today is whether an ecologically oriented society can be created out of the 
present anti-ecological one” (p.251).
Developmental Psychology
Bronfenbrenner (1979) further expanded the understanding and scope of 
ecological theory in psychology. He first applied ecological theory to human 
development, shedding light on the nurture side of psychological development. At the 
time, it was revolutionary thinking to move beyond individual and dyadic history and 
behavior to examine development. Bronfenbrenner (1979) also assembled the iconic 
human ecological representation of concentric circles expanding from the self (or 
ontogenetic level), consisting of: a) micro-system, b) meso-system, c) exo-system, and d) 
macro-system. The nested systems – each contained within the next level – could be used 
to visualize the contextual elements contributing to developmental paths and behaviors 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1979). As outlined previously, Bronfenbrenner (1979) also popularized 
the concept of ecological validity. In the interest of consistent nomenclature, pedagogical 
concerns, and comprehensiveness, I have amended Bronfenbrenner's (1979) classic levels 
to include: a) demo-system, b) micro-system, c) meso-system, d) exo-system, e) macro-
system, and f) geo-system. Most importantly, this change reflects the addition of the geo-
system, which represents the inhabited globe (or biosphere, a la Levine, Perkins, & 
Perkins, 2005) and the natural and social processes that transcend the traditional societal 
level of the macro-system. Also added is the demo-level, which subsumes the ontogenetic 
level of self, including individual biology, intrapsychic processes, etc. (See Appendix A).
24
Waring (1989) notes that the concept of an ecosystem is dimensionally undefined; 
it may be anything from a handful of soil to the entire Earth's biosphere. The defining of 
an ecosystem's boundaries depends on the phenomena of interest, time-scale, etc. and 
may cross national boundaries without regard for artificial lines that humanity has drawn 
on a map (Waring, 1989). Bronfenbrenner's (1979) circles and the adapted 6-level 
version used in this analysis create a heuristic framework to understand the layers of an 
ecosystem regardless of its dimensions.
Environmental Psychology
Roger Barker, one of the intellectual forebearers of environmental psychology, 
used extensive field research to create his theory of behavior settings. Barker (1963) 
states that, “[b]ehavior settings are bounded, self-regulated entities involving forces that 
form and maintain the component inhabitants and objects of settings in functioning 
patterns with stable attributes” (p. 31). Although theoretical and empirical work debates 
the long-term stability of settings, the theory of bidirectional influence and the methods 
used are enduring additions to ecological research. Barker (1965) demonstrates that there 
are environmental factors (in addition to inter-human factors) strongly and similarly 
impacting the behavior of different actors in the same setting or differentially impacting 
the same actor in diverse settings. Based on this idea, Barker (1965) posits that behavior 
settings are not merely a region that determines the behavior of people within it with 
varying effect, but an “entity” that regulates some behaviors of actors within it through a 
system of punishment and reinforcement. A particular setting will demand certain 
behaviors and interactions when different sized groups of actors are within the setting. 
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Thus, any setting variable should be tracked for better understanding of the totality of a 
setting's influence; even temperature should be seen as a variable that affects human 
behavior (Moos, 1976). 
Barker's behavior settings are the building block of ecological psychology (Moos, 
1976). Barker (1968) states that:
The essential nature of the units with which ecology deals is the same whether 
they are physical, social, biological, or behavioral units: (a) they occur without 
feedback from the investigator, they are self generated; (b) each unit has a time-
space locus; (c) an unbroken boundary separates an internal pattern from a 
differing external pattern. By these criteria, an electron, a person, and a waterfall 
are ecological units. This is true also of most towns and cities... (p. 11). 
Although these parameters were observed by Barker and colleagues, these attempts at 
contextual laws still ignore the effects of external disturbances that evidence the 
fluctuating and artificial nature of ecological boundaries. Still, these parameters grant 
researchers the ability to determine settings for ecologically valid research – as long as 
one accepts the limitations of its boundaries.
Rather than seeing an environment as a single entity, a single physical 
environment may be made up of sub-environments; personal characteristics can be 
conceived as the consequence of an environment or a constant set of variables within that 
environment (Wolf, 1974). Wolf (1974) also notes that these sub-environments overlap, 
creating the influential characteristics of a physical environment, acting on the individual. 
Wicker (1974) adds that measuring these overlapping environments may be at the 
expense of traditional rigor:
Research must reflect the interdependencies of the man-environment [sic] 
relationship. Studies must not treat persons or settings merely as objects to be 
measured, but rather as interacting components of a system. Complexities must be 
grappled with, even at the expense of certain niceties of research design. Quick 
and easy research studies must be replaced by careful, thoughtful attempts to 
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understand the dynamics of settings. Research problems must dictate research 
methods and the choice of measuring instruments, not the reverse. (p. 613)
One of the central ideas to Barker's (1978b) critique of mainstream psychological 
research is the concept of behavior tesserae; tesserae, commonly known as pieces of 
glass or marble used in mosaic work, are seen behaviorally as behavioral fragments 
selected by researchers to suit his or her goals and methods. In this way, the researcher 
disrupts the natural units of behavior and imposes an artificial mosaic – or tesserae – of 
behavioral pieces in its place (Barker, 1978b). In short, behavior units are discovered, 
behavior tesserae are designed. “Behavior tesserae have greater harmony with the 
theoretical and mathematical zeitgeist of present-day science than do behavior units. It 
has been a triumph of modern psychology to devise behavior tesserae that fit the 
conceptual and methodological cannons of modern science.” (Barker 1978b, p. 14) These 
tesserae cannot capture the intricacies of streaming behavior, hence the need for behavior 
settings research.
A classic example of a behavior setting is illustrated in a classroom described by 
Barker (1968): “There is a synomorphic relation between the pattern of the behavior 
occurring within the class and the pattern of its nonbehavioral components, the behavior 
objects. The seats face the teacher's desk, and the children face the teacher, for example” 
(p. 17). In the classroom example, the interaction of physical and social pressures 
demands certain behaviors, regardless of differing occupants. Obviously, there are 
differences from one classroom to another, but there are surprisingly similar parameters 
for behavior across classrooms in geographically diverse locations. 
Barker (1968) also theorized and measured the effects of undermanned (or 
understaffed) versus optimally manned (or optimally staffed) and overmanned (or 
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overstaffed) settings. According to Barker (1968), every setting has a particular optimal 
population for functioning. Less staffing results in people fulfilling multiple necessary 
roles and more people results in excess human resource. Barker (1963) asserts that 
understaffed settings promote greater sense of belonging, greater acceptance of diversity, 
and greater acceptance of responsibility – balanced with less competition. Behavioral 
modification is achieved by steering deviant individuals toward acceptable parameters. 
Overstaffing results in excess and unneeded actors that are less invested in common goals 
and more competitive; behavioral parameters are policed by “veto,” in which deviant 
actors are simply ejected from the setting (Barker, 1963). Katz and Kahn (1978) assert 
that surplus energy and resources (organizational slack) is necessary for the regeneration 
and growth of a system (as cited in Kelly, Ryan, Altman, and Stelzner, 2000). From a 
staffing perspective, this seems to undercut Barker's (1963) determination that 
overstaffing has numerous and exclusively negative effects when compared to 
understaffing. More recently, Perkins (1982) empirically supported the task effects of 
undermanned versus overmanned settings theorized by Barker but did not find the 
subjective experience effects hypothesized by Barker. Regardless of its limitations, 
Barkers behavior settings deserve further investigation and elaboration. In an age of 
online communities, perhaps contemporary behavior settings research could explain 
behavioral patterns in chat rooms, on blogs, and in the myriad other emerging means for 
humans to interact.
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Community Psychology
Shinn and Rapkin (2000) assert that, “ [a] central tenet of community psychology 
is that human behavior must be understood in context” (p. 669). Brody (2000) also notes 
that in community psychology it is accepted that physical environment strongly 
influences social interaction. Centrality and acceptance aside, Levine, Perkins, and 
Perkins (2005) observe that, “…conceptualizing and measuring the environment of 
human behavior are relatively recent developments in psychology, and at present there is 
no single coherent and comprehensive theory” (p. 118). Although psychologists had been 
using the ecological model to aid in the understanding of mental illness for over thirty 
years before the Swampscott Conference in 1965 (Dunham, 1940), no one had 
systematically adapted actual principles of ecology into any form of psychology until 
Kelly (1968). At the forefront of the emerging field of community psychology, Kelly 
(1968) adapted several tenets of natural ecology for use within community settings. He 
found interdependence, cycling of resources, adaptation and succession to be useful 
lenses to view community issues through. Although the original focus of these principles 
was mostly limited to community mental health and the adaptation of the principles was 
also limited, Kelly (1968) set the stage for more widespread adoption of ecological 
conventions within community psychology. There is certainly an overt adoption the 
ecological analogy in CP, although Shinn (1990) reminds us that, “...community 
psychology needs to pay more than lip service to issues of level in developing theory, 
defining variables, and testing relationships” (Shinn, 1990, p. 126).
A 1970 National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) report by Kelly, Goldsmith, 
Coelho and Randolph expressed the need for an interdisciplinary approach to ecological 
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theory, which they saw as central to understanding communities. This perspective 
includes explicit research assumptions based on the values of CP; Kingry-Westergaard & 
Kelly (1990) note that, “[w]ithout explicit assumptions, researchers run the risk of tacitly 
endorsing assumptions that they themselves may not consider to be valid, authentic, apt, 
or robust for conducting research in community psychology” (p. 23). By 1980, ecology 
had permeated much of community psychology; according to McClure, et al. (1980), the 
three defining characteristics of community psychology (based on previous models 
espoused in the field) are: “(a) a competency-prevention-oriented theoretical perspective, 
(b) a preference for organizational and community ecological levels of intervention, and 
(c) the need for an ecologically valid research base” (p. 1000). As 2 out of 3 
characteristics are based on the ecological model, it is obvious that ecological validity is a 
deep concern to the field.
Much of the community psychology literature that utilizes ecological theory only 
focuses on human/social ecology, at most taking into account the abiotic elements that 
directly affect human behavior. To curb limited ecological thinking, Shinn and Toohey 
(2003) introduced the concept of context minimalization error, which is “...the tendency 
to ignore the impact of enduring neighborhood and community contexts on human 
behavior” (p. 427). Interestingly, they suggest that researchers are more prone to commit 
the context minimalization error than lay people. As a field that claims to pay special 
attention to context, community psychologists must increase efforts to avoid such error. 
Without a full systems view of phenomena, most community psychology models are best 
described as acting within the interactional science perspective – or at best, the 
organismic science perspective. 
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Levine, Perkins, and Perkins (2005) outline four levels of ecosystem that include 
a more complete picture of ecological theory for community psychology: a) Population, 
b) community, c) ecosystem, and d) biosphere. Population refers to a group of individuals 
with similar demographic markers, roles, etc. Community refers to the populations that 
share a defined area, normally geographically defined. Ecosystem refers to the 
community, the inanimate environment, and the interactions between them. Biosphere 
refers to the larger inhabited environment, or can refer to the entire earth. This model 
synthesizes most of the ecological models previously used in community psychology, 
while still including the natural environment. The ecological framework presented in 
Levine, Perkins, and Perkins (2005) is not a comprehensive view of ecologies, but it is a 
solid step in the right direction for community psychology. 
Community psychology is far closer to the human science perspective outlined by 
Polkinghorne (1983) than many other fields. Bry, Hirsch, Newbrough, Reischl, & 
Swindle (1990) explain the human science perspective: All science is a social matter in 
which researchers not only choose method but their conceptual position—often by 
defaulting to the accepted assumptions of “normal science.” Tolan, Chertok, Keys, and 
Jason (1990) assert that community psychology has always avoided falling under the 
category of normal science (a la Kuhn, 1996), as its ideal values and motivations as a 
field are critical and transactional. As an ecologically minded human science that still 
values psychology, community psychology straddles two concepts that are sometimes in 
extreme tension with each other; Shinn and Rapkin (2000) note that, “[w]ere we to lose 
this ultimate connection to the individual, we would cease to be psychologists, but when 
we confine ourselves to the individual level, we lose our community identity” (p. 678).
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Ecological proponents have emerged from a variety of disciplines to help shape a 
contextual and ecological understanding of behavioral phenomena (Kingry-Westergaard 
& Kelly, 1990). Ecologically valid methods may act as a catalyst for the synthesis 
between varied ecologically minded disciplines – including environmental science and 
the social sciences. Moos and Brownstein (1977) also noted over 3 decades ago that 
environmental science and utopianism have reached a stage in their development where 
they are primed for the mutual exchange of ideas. As CP continues to pursue ecologically 
valid perspectives and methods, community psychologists have the opportunity to be at 
the forefront of this synthesis.
Community psychology versus mainstream psychology. While Community 
psychologists were exploring the complexities of ecological interactions, mainstream 
psychology – mired in Behaviorism – was beginning to understand the effects of context 
on behavior. Bandura (1978) explicates the now famous theory of reciprocal 
determinism. Bandura’s theory sees an individual as an actor in context, creating a 
dialogical relationship between subject and environment that determines behavior. 
Compared to the radical behaviorism that preceded Bandura (1978), reciprocal 
determinism was a relatively enlightened explanation for individual behavior. From an 
ecological perspective, reciprocal determinism is still exceedingly reductionistic, just at a 
higher level of analysis than radical behaviorism. Shinn (1990) partially blames 
psychology's preoccupation with individual level measurement on the, “...confusion 
between the consciously perceived environment and the functionally significant 
environment...” (p. 122), and that, “[t]he assertion that one can assess extraindividual 
units of conceptualization by questioning individuals requires scrutiny” (p. 114). Montero 
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(2002) clarifies this limitation by illuminating the context to the dialectic of reciprocal 
determinism: According to Montero (2002), all human action is an “open work” which is 
subject to interpretation by any other involved person, as well as anyone somehow 
connected to the interaction. Regardless of their awareness of the ever-expanding context, 
an actor within the subject-object dialectic affects and is affected by transcendent 
elements of their ecology (Montero, 2002). Thus, reciprocal determinism is an element of 
a larger dynamic topography, wherein any discrete subject-object interaction is an 
artificial abstraction and must be viewed as such.
There are other reasons aside from values and theoretical underpinnings acting as 
a barrier to ecologically valid research. Wicker (1990) asserts that statistical significance 
is necessary for publication, generating higher-level variables from aggregated 
individual-data is more likely to be conducted due to the system of rewards. Investigators 
that use more appropriate methods or different methods at different levels may produce 
more ecologically valid research at the expense of statistical significance (Wicker, 1990). 
Reppucci (1990) claims that finding publication outlets for ecologically oriented research 
is more difficult because it is not seen as rigorous by normal scientific standards. Brody 
(2000) notes that specifically environmentally oriented research by psychologists lacks a 
foothold outside of academia. The ecology of publication and academic success is often a 
major barrier to ecologically valid research.
Environmental degradation and CP. Humans have transformed the environment 
they live in, often with destructive results (Moos, 1976); both the natural and built 
environment should be thought of as part of the world that we must live in and adapt to in 
order to survive. Brody (2000) asserts that community psychologists can contribute to the 
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resolution of environmental issues by showing that pollution isn't just measured in dollars 
or incidence of disease but must include behavioral and emotional reactions and their 
effects on social relationships. Pollutants directly cause learning disabilities and mood 
disorders (Brody, 2000), while ecological crises are closely bound to social justice issues 
(Bookchin, 2003). Although rare, some community psychologists are deeply concerned 
about environmental issues; Culley and Hughey (2008) take issues of hazardous waste 
disposal and their interaction with power and participation head on. Climate change has 
also recently emerged as a theory and research focus for community psychologists (see 
the upcoming special issue edited by Manuel Riemer and Stephanie Reich in the 
American Journal of Community Psychology), but Brody (2000) maintains that the 
question isn't: “Why is environment emerging as an important focus for community 
psychology; but rather: Why is it still emerging more than 25 years after the first Earth 
Day?” (p. 942). Environmental action by community psychologists – even with its direct 
links to the ecological perspective – is more in its infancy than adherence to ecological 
methods and theories.
In community psychology's defense, environmental action and activism is 
contentious even within the field of ecology; May (1989) notes that discussion of 
ecological boundaries and disturbances among ecologists are often polarized – from those 
that believe that evolution has tried all avenues and there is little to worry about to those 
that believe the stars are disturbed by picking a flower. May (1989) establishes that 
laboratory experiments and field observations demonstrate how important spatial and 
temporal scale is to the relationship between observable behavior, phenomena, etc. and 
relevant ecological context; the persistence of populations may require more area and 
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resources than they inhabit and disturbances to seemingly unrelated regions and resources 
may have lasting impacts on people, non-human organisms, and places. The balance of 
evidence and opinion in ecology rests on the side of caution. Ecologies can and have been 
changed by human and nonhuman disturbance; human change can be a side effect of 
“anti-environmental” actions or well intentioned environmental policy – although both 
can be seen as changing ecologies in a non-natural way or at an artificial pace. Hopefully 
intentional change is preferable to merely accepting side effects of human action or 
attempting to detach from the environment completely. Brody (2000) urges the field that, 
“[t]he fates of local and global communities are our issues as community psychologist. 
As professionals, we must become involved” (p. 944).
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CHAPTER IV
ECOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES ADAPTED TO COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY
Identifying major ecological principles can be a moving target; McIntosh (as cited 
in Cherrett, 1989) reminds us that, “It is clear that ecologists are not unprincipled, but it is 
very difficult to find consensus among ecologists on what a principle is, or on specific 
principles” (p. 14). In a survey of the British Ecological Society (Cherrett, 1989), the 8 
most important concepts in ecology were: The ecosystem, succession, energy flow, 
conservation of resources, competition, niche, materials cycling, and the community. 
Although this highlights theoretical priorities, one respondent aptly noted that the 
multidimensional nature of ecology renders the project of ranking of concepts by 
importance “pointless” and “absurd.” Regardless, these rankings give us an idea of 
priority of theory in natural ecology. According to Kelly et al. (2000), an ecological 
approach also has a balanced view of social structures (elements of a setting that provide 
opportunities and/or reinforcement for interaction and behavior for system members) and 
social processes (actions within a system that interact with, are influenced by, and 
influence social structures). Structures are often the focus of environmental research, 
especially since processes are much harder to define and measure. Kelly (1968) did an 
admirable job of adapting many of these conceptual processes, but there are several 
useful concepts that can be added to the project of an ecological metaphor in community 
psychology.
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The following is an attempt to create a more comprehensive adaptation of 
ecological concepts for community study. Including Kelly's (1968) 4 concepts (some 
modified for better theoretical fit) and additional useful concepts integrated from natural 
ecology by myself (and clarified by J.R. Newbrough) – especially the list generated by 
Cherrett (1989), following are the 7 most relevant ecological concepts for community 
psychology: Interdependence, adaptation, succession, cycling, entropy, centripetal versus 
centrifugal focus, and diversity versus homogeneity. Concepts newer to community 
psychology are explained in further detail than those explicated by Kelly (1968).
Interdependence
Interdependence is one of the 4 elements introduced to community psychology by 
Kelly (1968). This concept represents the ecological connections between levels, people, 
organizations, etc., making up the basis of holistic and ecological thinking. Kelly, et al. 
(2000) note that, “The essence of the ecological perspective is to construct and 
understanding of the interrelationships of social structures and social processes of the 
groups, organizations, and communities in which we live and work. The concept of 
interdependence is the basic axiom of the ecological perspective” (p. 133). From a 
community perspective, interdependence also includes power relationships between 
elements of the ecology, e.g., stakeholders, researchers, organizations, workers, 
politicians, etc. Interdependence embodies the reliance of ecological elements on each 
other, as well as their co-influence.
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Adaptation
Another concept from Kelly (1968), adaptation means that elements or actors 
within an ecology learn and adapt to their dynamic context. In CP, this can refer to 
learning organizations, seeking training and education, community organizing efforts, 
etc. Adaptation can be represented by individuals or organizations understanding the 
adaptation happening in a context or action to initiate or encourage adaptation in people, 
organizations, neighborhoods, communities, etc.
Adaptation also relates to the ecological concept of niche; niche traditionally 
refers to a place in a community for a population or sub-population of organisms. 
Organisms can adapt to fit existing niches or modify contexts to create a niche. In 
contemporary ecology, niche instead refers to “a multidimensional utilization 
distribution” (Schoener, 1989, p. 79) which is essentially a population's use of resources 
and habitat – changing the definition from a recess to the occupant of the recess (or its 
stable patterns of consumption and behavior). According to Schoener (1989), a niche is 
defined by food, space, and time. Using the utilization distribution definition of niche, 
this can be represented as a histogram of resource use by a given population. By tracking 
resource use patterns of a population, sub-population, or individual, one can determine its 
level of adaptation and the magnitude of the niche.
Succession
Succession represents the natural changeover in contextual elements in an 
ecology. In nature, this can refer to a young forest yielding to a hardwood forest over 
time (Miller, 2000). In a community, this may refer to a neighborhood converting from 
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industrial factory buildings to lofts and restaurants – or any changeover of built elements 
that affects or changes inhabitants (Forrester, 1975). 
It is important to note that although ecologies often evolve over time, sometimes 
this process is sped up, slowed, or changed entirely by forces external to the local system. 
Hettinger and Throop (2008) note that broad changes like climate or smaller scale 
changes like fire, species invasion, draughts, changes in soil composition, etc. continually 
change ecosystems without immediately discernible stable patterns. As previously 
described, the disturbance of seemingly balanced and isolated systems is a part of the 
process of succession; focusing on local equilibrium is problematic and unrealistic 
(Hettinger & Throop, 2008). Still, much like Lewin's (1997) force field analysis, 
understanding ongoing processes of succession grant researchers the knowledge of social 
momentum and what amount of intervention it might take to negatively or positively 
catalyze current system trends.
Cycling
Modeled after the first law of energy and the law of conservation of matter 
(Energy and matter can neither be created nor destroyed), cycling follows the flow of 
energy, currency, resources, populations, time, etc. as it moves within and between 
settings. Similar to Kelly's (1968) cycling of resources, cycling is intended to highlight 
the historicity of people, settings, and resources, while aiding in the tracking and/or 
planning of their trajectory.
The first law of energy states that energy can neither be created nor destroyed 
(Miller, 2000). In natural ecology, this law is applied to any natural cycle – including 
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human energy creation and consumption cycles – and must be taken into account when 
analyzing any natural phenomenon. The source, use, and destination of energy involved 
are telling of many useful data. Efficiency, opportunities for conservation, and potential 
hazards or blind spots are some of the useful pieces of information that are yielded from 
applying the first law of energy.
The application of cycling to community psychology is a good fit and beneficial. 
In many cases within the field of psychology – even in community psychology – events 
are viewed as discrete phenomenon. Energy and resources utilized for a project, program, 
etc. are seen as either available or not; projects, communities, people, and organizations 
obtain or divert energy and resources, then use them until they are gone. Although this 
notion of energy and matter dynamics is basically functional, it oversimplifies and 
overlooks many important factors. The application of cycling relates to the flow of 
energy and resources; since nothing can be created nor destroyed, all resources can be 
traced on a continuum from the source direction and to the exhaust direction. This 
exercise informs us of the origins of funding, volunteer workers, participant enthusiasm, 
etc. It also traces the distal origins of resources for community work that may conflict 
with the values and goals of participants, organizers, and researchers. Rosen (1993) 
asserts that action research has been significantly shaped by funding sources, more so 
than by any value-based or disciplinary logic. Many social science research projects are 
funded by government sources, some of which are ideologically bound to stances on 
issues that are under litigation or legislation, calling into question the intended purpose of 
the research results (Fincher, 1985). Brieger (2005) illuminates the ethical dilemmas 
faced by social science researchers: Can the results of the analysis be used to identify 
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vulnerable populations? Will the military utilize our best research tools to achieve goals 
incongruent with our values? Do our funding sources dictate the purpose of our research? 
These questions can be understood through the application of the cycling concept.
Cycling can be applied conceptually in numerous situations. Marger (2005) 
outlines the complexities of social mobility, showing that an actor does not spontaneously 
create the resources necessary for upward mobility, but diverts them from other sources 
and cycles, and then exhausts them into yet another set of cycles. By this logic, an 
individual that exerts upward mobility likely causes the downward mobility of others. 
Miller (2000) also paraphrases the first law of energy as “there is no away”(p. 24), 
meaning that all resources, energy, etc. must go somewhere when discarded. Bags of 
trash do not simply go away when thrown in a trash can; they fill up landfills, leech into 
water tables, blow away, and so on. Forrester (1969) posited urban dynamic theories 
wherein neighborhood revitalization was recommended as a means of increasing 
wellbeing of the community; the theories never included where the people who lived in 
these neighborhoods would go, nor how they would get there. For the people currently 
living in so-called “undesirable” neighborhoods, there is no away.
Entropy
Modeled after the second law of energy, which states that the transfer of energy 
reduces the quality of energy, the entropy represents the degrading of energy and 
resources as they transfer between and through individuals, organizations, and systems. 
This can be seen as the decay of funding as it passes through organizations, the diffusion 
of responsibility and motivation through meetings, etc. 
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The second law of energy states that when energy changes forms, some of the 
useful energy decays into a less useful, diffused form (Miller, 2000). Another way to 
state the second law of energy is that high quality energy naturally degrades into low 
quality energy. Whether in nature or in an organization, this means that you can’t break 
even (Miller, 2000); every process or use of resources toward a goal loses some of its 
value without any gain in trade. J.R. Newbrough succinctly coined the term entropy tax 
to describe this phenomenon (personal communication, April 13, 2006). Supporting the 
concept of entropy, in an ecosystem, Waring (1989) states that recovery takes place most 
rapidly where energy travels efficiently and rapidly through systems. This easily 
translates into human systems where overly bureaucratic and laborious systems are slow 
to recover from disturbance – just as they are slow to dynamically adapt to any change.
The New SPECs organizational change project was witness to an excellent 
example of the second law of energy; by tracing the path of money donated to help the 
wellbeing of communities, the decay of energy is apparent. When money is donated to a 
regional funding agency, a portion is diffused into the organization for administrative 
costs. The value of the energy – now filtered into the organization – has degraded into a 
less usable form. The funds are now allocated to another organization, wherein the same 
process of partial decay occurs. The organization then implements services that less-than-
efficiently increase the wellbeing of community members. The original energy granted to 
the system in the form of funding degrades into many pockets of diffused energy that 
cannot be traded back for the higher quality energy that it once was. An obvious contrast 
to this diffusion would be directly funding those in need, thus alleviating the entropy tax, 
but numerous other barriers stand in front of this one efficiency. 
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Jong-sung (2005) compared the corruption in 129 countries, noting its effects on 
the disadvantaged members of society. Corruption can be viewed as an entropy tax 
similarly to more legitimate funding inefficiencies. Reduction in the diffusion of 
resources increases legitimacy and strategic decision-making ability of governments and 
organizations (Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, & Eden, 2005). Understanding and reducing the 
decay of energy within a system improves efficiency, legitimacy, and available resources. 
This process and goal are congruent with community psychology’s methods and values.
Kelly et al. (2000) cites Katz and Kahn's (1978) concept of negative entropy as an 
efficient utilization of resources to resist the natural entropy within an organization; the 
focus on efficiency is important to slow entropy, but an expanded ecological perspective 
would reveal that using resources to prevent entropy are likely speeding entropy either in 
another system or at another level within the same system. In natural systems, it is 
commonly seen that the creation of order or higher-level energy is accompanied by 
entropy of greater magnitude at higher levels of ecology. Thus, the idea of negative 
entropy denies the tenet of cycling of resources.
Centripetal Versus Centrifugal Focus
Based on the ecological tenet of conservation of resources and related to concepts 
of decentralization and efficiency, centripetal versus centrifugal focus represents an 
inward focus (efficiency, conservation, and focus on current strengths) instead of an 
outward focus (externalized, standardized, technical strategies). This focus on 
conservation and use of existing and internal resources versus a focus on unlimited 
growth and external solutions and resources is based on knowledge of resources, 
43
processes, and strengths of a system, rather than large-scale nomothetic approaches to 
social issues. Centripetal strategies include decentralization of processes, focusing on 
existing strengths, and retooling of existing resources. Non-ecologically valid centrifugal 
strategies include using exterior technical strategies, centralized power and solutions, 
unlimited growth, externalizing costs of issues, and disempowering, deficit addressing 
programs.
Modern science – with social science being no exception – mostly relies on 
external, centralized technical strategies for “solving” problems (Miller, 2000). In many 
cases, the overuse of such technology has aided in the development of social problems in 
the first place – as well as inept, behemoth bureaucratic mechanisms intended to manage 
these problems. Centrifugal, external strategies can also be seen in the “program” 
approach to issues, wherein generally standardized sets of educational or skill-building 
gauntlets are created for community members and workers to run through. After this 
“intervention,” self-reliance and gratitude are expected. 
Most visible in energy production (e.g., nuclear power plants), costs of some 
aspects of processes are often externalized (Miller, 2000). In the energy market, nuclear 
power is cheep and plentiful. Of course, this cost does not include many prices for which 
people have and will pay dearly. The decay life of plutonium is longer than the history of 
humanity, while nuclear reactors must be decommissioned after about 40 years – 
entombed or disassembled for long-term storage. Uranium tailings are still piled high in 
the southwestern United States (Kuletz, 1998). None of these costs – like health, security, 
storage, etc. – are included in the market cost. 
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Many decisions made in communities are made without much thought to the 
externalized costs. When tax incentives are given to factories so that they will move their 
operations to a community, what will be lost from the revenues? What will pay for the 
pollution that is created? When whole neighborhoods are cleared out to make room for a 
new development, where will the people go? Can they even afford to shop in the stores 
that have supplanted their homes? Costs measured in diminished well-being are almost 
always externalized. It is the responsibility of the community psychologist to re-
internalize those costs.
Seeking centripetal solutions requires a different approach; instead of adding 
something to a problem situation or community to solve problems, the ecologically 
minded researcher utilizes existing skills, resources, and relationships while 
simultaneously reducing the need for more resources than are at hand. This tenet is 
partially echoed in Nelson and Prilleltensky's (2005) strengths-based approach to 
communities, clients, and participants, in which researchers and practitioners focus on 
available strengths instead of deficiencies to be filled externally. Increasing efficiency, 
focusing on the strengths of communities and their members, and reducing reliance on 
outside entities increases resilience and empowers those who would otherwise merely be 
the beneficiaries of temporary interventions. This is related to Lewin’s (1997) force field 
analysis, in which barriers may be removed instead of adding force to achieve a goal.
The tenet of centripetal versus centrifugal focus can be directly related to Barker's 
(1963) observations on staffing; understaffed versus overstaffed settings are congruent 
with the prevailing direction of forces within a setting. Understaffed settings focus 
inward to better utilize existing strengths for fulfilling necessary functions – essentially 
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centripetal. Such a focus is unifying and efficient. Overstaffed settings display an 
outward force, vetoing out actors, resources, and behaviors that do not fit narrower 
criteria – essentially centrifugal. In contrast, this focus fractures settings through 
inefficient divisiveness.
Diversity Versus Homogeneity 
This tenet represents acknowledging, celebrating, and cultivating diversity over 
conformity and monocultures. Diversity is at the root of adaptation and survival in the 
natural world (Miller, 2000). Without diversity, crops are wiped out, species become 
wholly diseased, and global temperature-shifts destroy entire ecosystems. Barker (1963) 
emphasizes the importance of this tenet for understanding systems and urges researchers 
to observe diversity's connections to unity and stability within a behavior setting. Walker 
(1989) asserts that diverse ecosystems provide multiple paths for energy flow which 
allows for function and relative stability even when there is destructive disruption to the 
system; complex biotic webs are a more stable network than simpler systems (i.e. 
monocultures).
From the perspective of natural ecology, diversity does not always mean harmony 
or balance between inhabitants of a system; Hettinger and Throop (2008) note that many 
ecologists do not believe in integrated, stable communities of varying species; many 
species are opportunistic and are only held in stability by predators, food supply, climatic 
or geographic features, etc. This competition is often a necessary element for non-human 
systems, but human communities can (but unfortunately often don't) forego some 
competition for cooperation; although some ecologists note similarities between non-
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human and human communities, the comparison ignores the “shared purpose and 
meaning” (Hettinger and Throop, 2008, p. 189) that often hold human communities 
together (and presumably cannot be found in nonhuman communities). 
Barker (1963) outlines extensive research that demonstrates how understaffing 
and overstaffing behavior settings have a distinct effect upon diversity: Understaffing 
preserves diversity, as all actors are important for functioning; overstaffing allows actors 
in control to “veto” out fringe actors, thus reducing diversity. Kelly, et al. (2000) argues 
that diversity of ideas can come from the “slack” that emerges when excess resources 
(e.g., time and staff)are available. Regardless, the balance of diversity versus 
homogeneity is linked to behavior settings and organizational theory. Barker (1963) 
reinforces the need for diversity, stating that, “...in any self-regulated system variety 
within the system is necessary if varied disturbances outside the system are to be 
countered” (p. 38). The survival of a system rests solidly on its ability to maintain 
diversity.
Ecological diversity need not only mean diversity of individual actors in a system. 
Diversity of systems, cultures, or viewpoints are also important. Adherence to this tenet 
can also be demonstrated by diversity of research methods, tailored approaches for 
systems change, etc. Campbell (1969) emphasizes the need for research diversity for 
effective inquiry; adhering to this tenet moves research closer to Campbell's (1969) 
vision of interdisciplinary, multi-method research.
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CHAPTER V
MARKERS OF ECOLOGICAL VALIDITY IN COMMUNITY RESEARCH
In order to measure ecological validity, it is first necessary to identify the markers 
of ecologically sound research, and then establish a generalizable instrument for 
measuring the markers. Law and Watkinson (1989) note that community ecology (a sub-
discipline of natural ecology) has a difficult time establishing an empirical foundation for 
itself – especially because interactions and their strengths are the basis for community 
ecology and are tremendously difficult to measure relative to population characteristics. 
This difficulty is echoed in community psychology; as we attempt to establish 
transactional science empirically, we are constantly attempting to use old tools for a new 
job. Measuring the interactions and relationships in a community requires a unique – and 
likely contextually bound – combination of existing, emerging, and heretofore 
undiscovered tools and perspectives. 
Theoretical Underpinnings
As outlined in the previous literature review, ecological theory is a rich and useful 
perspective for designing, understanding, and implementing research. It is important that 
community researchers have a solid understanding of ecological theory. This 
understanding can be observed through the literature consulted for the conceptualization 
of the research, the logic of the research design, and the perceived implications of the 
research by the researcher(s). Trickett (1990) adds that, “...truly adventuresome 
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ecological research would integrate the research relationship with the scope, quality, and 
impact of the data, it would assess interventions across settings and levels of analysis; 
and it would develop constructs that derive their power from a collaborative research 
process” (p. 213). Such “adventuresome” ecological research adds to its validity – 
especially the potentially positive impact on communities.
Ecological theory that has influenced and been widely cited in the literature of 
community psychology is included in the assessment, as well as an understanding and 
integration of the levels, processes, and concerns put forth by these theories. Fortunately, 
conceptualizing and distilling the temporal, spatial, and theoretical dimensions of 
ecological research has been started in community psychology; Christens and Perkins 
(2008) created a framework for conceptualizing work at different levels of ecology 
through a temporal process of liberation that highlights the complexity of ecological 
analysis and the myriad levels, sectors, and periods within a process where researchers 
and practitioners can theorize, act, and measure. First, it is important to outline methods 
for community research that have the ability to capture ecological levels and processes – 
thus achieving a higher level of ecological validity.
Current Methods and Methodology in Community Psychology
Community psychology and its focus on ecological – or at least contextual – 
perspectives is not known for innovation in its analysis, with most of its empirical work 
utilizing an embarrassingly narrow range of analytic approaches (Luke, 2005). Tolan, 
Chertok, Keys, and Jason (1990) note that community psychology is a field that tends to 
constructively struggle with balancing rigorous methodology and our values that promote 
49
social action. Shinn (1990) attributes community researchers lack of success in 
understanding and changing higher ecological levels to a lack of understanding of 
variables at multiple levels and selection issues with measurement and statistical analyses 
beyond the individual. Rapkin and Mulvey (1990) remind us that community issues are 
complex and that the methods we use must reflect this complexity. McClure, et al. (1980) 
sampled research articles from the American Journal of Community Psychology, the 
Journal of Community Psychology, the Journal of Community and Applied Social 
Psychology, and the Community Mental Health Journal, determining that community 
psychologists and community mental health professionals often theorize and 
conceptualize research phenomenon from the community perspective but rarely intervene 
at the community level and almost never conduct high quality community-level research 
– almost always working at the individual and small-group level. This mismatch alludes 
to a lack of training in methods to capture community level phenomena, a culture of 
acceptance of individual-level methods, and a rewards structure for more traditional 
methods and instruments.
In 1957, Trow (as cited in Bryman, 1984) suggested that methods of investigation 
should be dictated by the problem of focus, rather than the other way around. Trow also 
contraindicated the espousal of one or few methods to suit all problems for inquiry 
(Bryman, 1984). Although the intricacies of this suggestion may be challenged, 
community inquiry and ecological perspectives often rest on methods almost antithetical 
to ecological systems thinking. By aggregating data to a single level – which most 
statistical analyses do – multiple levels of an ecosystem are artificially compressed, 
resulting in a tremendous loss of information. Not only is this antithetical to systems 
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thinking, but technically impractical as well. Luke (2005) perceptively describes this 
contradiction, stating that “…although community scientists value contextual thinking, 
we are much less likely to actually employ contextual methods” (p. 188). These 
contradictions do not occur because community psychologists do not actively pursue 
methodology congruent with their theories, ethics, and values. Differing from mainstream 
psychology, community psychology must observe the relationship between inquiry and 
community while developing a multiple method framework for inquiry that reflects its 
theoretical backdrop (Dokecki, 1992). 
Waring (1989) notes that studies of natural ecosystems have moved from 
descriptive to predictive, making accurate theory, measurement, and action more 
important than ever. To keep pace with advances in ecological theory and human science 
methods, we must move beyond traditional methods. According to Barker (1978b), the 
discrete segments artificially present in interviews, experiments, tests, etc. in labs did not 
prepare the researchers with methods for “...recording the unbroken behavior stream, no 
concepts and techniques for identifying its parts and pieces, and no system for analyzing 
its attributes” (p. 3). Since community psychology observes the ecological context of 
community settings, a fruitful methodology that observes this relationship would stem 
from and support an ecological perspective.
While traditional methods force data into static and stable notions of behavior, it 
is the dynamic and varied nature of behavior that makes us human; Barker (1974) notes 
that “[o]ne of the obvious characteristics of human behavior is its variation” (p. 255). 
Changes in statistical knowledge, computer hardware capabilities, and software options 
have led to innovative analytic strategies that are congruent with ecological assumptions 
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(Luke, 2005) – allowing better measurement of variation in human behavior. These 
innovations require technology and skills that are not readily available – nor sometimes 
appealing – to many researchers in the social sciences. Extensive qualitative methods also 
require aptitude, skills, and time that are hard to find, while participatory action research 
requires skills, time, and an abundant commitment to values of social change that are rare 
and sometimes unattainable in research settings. Sells (1974) also reminds us that the 
biggest barrier to ecological research is effectively encoding environments – as moving 
beyond measuring discrete behaviors and subjective experience is problematic. 
Regardless of the extensive prerequisites for ecological methodologies, for some 
researchers there is no other alternative congruent with their values and goals for 
research.
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CHAPTER VI
ECOLOGICAL METHODS
The methods this paper covers are multi-level statistical modeling, network 
analysis, deep qualitative research (e.g., ethnography), behavior settings research, 
participatory action research (PAR), geographic information systems (GIS), and dynamic 
modeling. Of course, there are many more methods available to researchers, as well as 
untold derivations and applications of each method outlined. Methods such as cluster 
analysis, naturalistic observation, participant observation, time-series analysis, etc. have 
the potential to achieve or bolster ecological validity; the methods chosen have 
significant overlap with many other excluded methods and grant a broad stroke of 
ecological methods. These methods are also often used in combination with each other in 
mixed-method designs, thus increasing their potential for triangulation and ecological 
validity. The following methods either intrinsically or potentially qualify as ecologically 
valid. The use of these methods are measured in the evaluative framework – spanning 
within-level analysis to cross-level analysis and finally in trans-level analysis. Using the 
concept of ecological validity essentially demands striving for at least cross-level 
research. An ecological approach intrinsically focuses on transactions between systems as 
well as between people and systems simultaneously (Kelly, et al., 2000). Shinn and 
Rapkin (2000) note that, “...cross-level tools can...help us to understand the diversity of 
people's experiences...” (p. 692) but warn that, “... theory and methods develop in 
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tandem...” (p. 692), as mismatches in theory, research questions, measurement, and 
generalizing can void many of the advantages brought by higher ecological validity.
Statistical Multi-level Modeling (MLM)
Multi-level modeling – most commonly Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) – 
provides researchers with a theoretical and methodological match to cross-level 
phenomena (Shinn & Rapkin, 2000; also see Bryk & Raudenbusch, 1992, and Perkins & 
Taylor, 1996, for more detail). Allen (2005) effectively explains the importance of the 
advantages of MLM to ecological researchers: While more traditional statistical analyses 
treat all cases as equal, MLM retains the “nested” nature of community, school, and 
organizational data. By assuming nomothesis across cases and aggregating individual 
cases across levels, important information about groups and communities is lost. MLM 
not only fits ecological thinking, but supports ecological theory when other methods are 
used for triangulation. Perkins and Taylor (1996) use HLM to link data from content 
analysis, neighborhood inventories of systematic observations, and subjective surveys – 
providing support and detail to existing fear of crime and observed disorder theories. 
Khoury-Kassabri, Benbenishty, Astor, and Zeira (2004) use HLM to create an ecological 
model of school violence, since so many interacting factors influence any individual 
student. By triangulating the HLM results with historical and qualitative data, it is evident 
that context plays an important and complex role in human behavior. Dunifon (2005) 
uses HLM to determine the effects of a work program for welfare recipients, highlighting 
the group differences between program sites and population. This study sheds light on 
some of the ecological elements contributing to work success, while showing the long-
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term ineffectiveness of the program for increasing the income of welfare recipients. 
Parboteeah, Bronson, and Cullen (2005) use HLM to compare ethical attitudes and 
people’s willingness to justify ethically suspect behaviors. HLM allowed Parboteeah, et. 
al. (2005) to see similarities and differences within countries and between countries, 
effectively capturing the context of individuals and populations – showing the influences 
of political power, democratization, local attitude, national attitude, and proximity of 
nations on justification of ethically suspect behaviors. 
Hierarchical Linear Modeling is a relatively common statistical tool that captures 
much of the complexity of ecological theory. Shinn and Rapkin (2000) urge researchers 
to use caution when employing HLM (or presumably other multi-level statistical 
models); “HLM requires careful attention to potential influences within and across levels. 
Theoretical considerations must guide applications of HLM” (p. 673). Used in tandem 
with solid theory, multi-level statistical modeling is an important part of ecological 
research.
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM)
SEM is a complex and ever-evolving method to create and test models of latent 
concepts. SEM has steadily increased in popularity since 1980, spawning its own journal 
and becoming the most utilized statistical tool in methodology journals whose primary 
readership is psychologists (Tomarken & Waller, 2005). SEM is popular with 
psychologists because many concepts within the field are intangible and immeasurable, 
but are made up of measurable sub-factors. Due to recent innovations in multi-level SEM, 
ecological validity would be greatly increased with the inclusion of SEM’s ability to 
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create and test complex models of contextual connections, as well as constructs relevant 
to ecological researchers. 
Lee (1992) constructed a model of Quality Of Life (QOL) based on an ecological 
conceptualization. SEM allowed Lee (1992) to test whether measurable elements of 
subjects’ ecology contributed to his model of quality of life. This study blended 
subjective and objective measures at multiple levels, simultaneously showing the efficacy 
of the QOL model and ecological theory. Waldo (1999) used SEM to conceptualize 
heterosexism in the workplace. The ecological connections between jokes in the 
workplace, supervisors’ attitudes, number of non-heterosexual employees, etc. were 
modeled and included in the concept of workplace heterosexism. Experiencing 
heterosexism was associated with adverse psychological, health, and job-related 
outcomes, strengthening the ecological model that had been created. Ng Mak (2001) used 
SEM to trace potential effects of community and family violence on youth. Community 
and family violence were measured to see if either contributed to violent, aggressive 
behavior and depressive symptoms among youth. This study intended to support a model 
of aggression and desensitization to violence as a form of affect regulation for youth in 
violent contexts. The study was partially supported, finding that community violence 
contributed to youth’s desensitization to violence and subsequent increased 
aggressiveness.
Structural Equation Modeling has an ever-increasing potential to support and 
develop ecological theory. Although SEM cannot stand alone as a methodology to 
legitimize ecological theory – especially since it is most often used to focus on 
psychological constructs at the individual level – it provides a strong analytical technique 
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for the ecological researcher. SEM is likely second only to Dynamic Modeling in its 
complexity, prerequisite technology and skill, and intimidation to social science 
researchers. Time will tell if its contribution to theory testing will outweigh SEM’s 
drawbacks.
Social Network Analysis (SNA)
Hughey and Speer (2002) note the importance of considering the intricacies of 
networks in order to understand a community; the strength and centrality of social 
networks can be both positive and negative, so measuring nuances with network analysis 
can be a necessary tool for creating interventions. Personal networks are flexible, 
dialectically interacting with context and opportunity (Fleisher, 2006) – making 
understanding and measurement of networks an important part of ecological theory and 
research. Papachristos (2006) notes that SNA is both a theoretical orientation and a set of 
methodological techniques: As a theory, SNA stresses the interdependence between 
social actors and organizations. As a method, SNA techniques attempt to measure these 
interconnections as a novel strategy for moving beyond actor-based data.
Network analysis not only sheds light on important relationships, but significant 
gaps in relationships as well. For a community that is trying to increase collaboration 
between organizations, seeing network gaps can inform action (Provan, Veazie, Teufel-
Shone, & Huddleston, 2004). The structural and relational information gained from 
network analysis provides a distinctive means to study and or test theories (Wasserman & 
Faust, 1994). Network theory has many common principles with ecological theory, while 
network analysis provides many tools to test ecological connections. Network analysis 
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allows researchers to test the size of relevant ecological network connections, the strength 
and importance of each connection, and a limited picture of network structure (Luke, 
2005). The measurement of intergroup connectedness adds to our understanding of the 
pool of potential ties and network opportunities, geographic mobility, and the expansion 
of networks (Fleisher, 2006). The match in assumptions and methods makes network 
analysis an indispensable companion for the ecologically minded.
Network analysis tools are based on the analysis of relational data, made up of 
information about connections and relationships between participants, instead of being 
made up of information about the participants themselves (Wasserman & Faust, 1994; 
Luke, 2005). Wasserman and Faust (1994) outline four important concepts in the social 
networks perspective:
a) Actors and their actions are viewed as interdependent rather than independent, 
autonomous units; b) Relational ties (linkages) between actors are channels for 
transfer or “flow” of resources (either material or nonmaterial); c) Network 
models focusing on individuals view the network structural environment as 
providing opportunities for or constraints on individual action; and d) Network 
models conceptualize structure (social, economic, political, and so forth) as 
lasting patterns of relations among actors (p. 4).
Network analysis is the only way to provide and analyze this kind of structural 
information (Luke, 2005). This provides a useful and unique tool for triangulating 
phenomena within an ecosystem. 
Time consuming and unconventional data collection methods, relatively 
underdeveloped software applications, and difficulty with missing data are the major 
drawbacks to social network analysis. The subjectivity of self-report measures used for 
most SNA can also be problematic; Provan et. al. (2004) rated trust between actors in 
their network by asking them directly how much they trust each other on a scale from 1 
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to 4. Although scores were combined, the relatively small n and un-piloted, loaded trust 
question make the quality-of-relationship measurement rather subjective.
Network analysis has been used to model disease transmission, job seeking 
behaviors, the spread of ideas, behavior within organizations, community development, 
teen smoking patterns, and more (Luke, 2005). Innovations in social network analysis 
make this already useful tool indispensable for ecological researchers. Dynamic versions 
of social network analysis, able to track changes and measure persistence of relationships 
within networks, are now available and in development (Breiger, Carley, & Pattison, 
2003). As the technology and skills of dynamic social network analysis practitioners 
increase, its applications in ecology will be welcome and unique additions to 
transactional methodology. Within the foreseeable future, the drawbacks will likely be a 
small price to pay for the unique, rich knowledge that can be gained from SNA. 
Deep Qualitative Methods
Qualitative research is often an easier fit for ecologically minded researchers. 
Reppucci (1990) states that, “[m]ost studies that call themselves ecological are qualitative 
and descriptive in nature because designing an ecologically valid experiment is extremely 
difficult for both methodological and ethical reasons” (p. 160). Bryman (1984) states that 
many qualitative methods – e.g., ethnography and participant observation – aim to see 
phenomena from the perspective of research participants through direct involvement with 
them. This proximity grants the researcher contextual understanding that can only be 
understood from within the reality of an individual, group, or society’s ecology (Bryman, 
1984). Deep qualitative research methods allow researchers to be sensitive to the context 
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of phenomena. This means exploring the unique cultural heritage of research participants, 
while establishing a trust-based dialogue that allows the concerns and world-views of all 
persons involved to be heard and considered (Prilleltensky & Nelson, 2002). Qualitative 
research methods are well suited to support and triangulate ecological theory, although 
extensive enough to easily dwarf the scope of this paper.
Arensberg (1937/1968) uses ethnography to understand the economy, culture, and 
latent beliefs of Irish peasants in the beginning of the 20th century. This ethnography 
reveals the ecological connections across and between individual, micro, meso, exo, and 
macro levels across time, creating an extremely ecologically valid picture of the 
communities and their inhabitants. Through immersion, observation, and constant 
informal interviewing, Arensberg (1937/1968) reveals details not even available to the 
participants themselves. The main weakness of this approach from a community 
perspective is its lack of intervention or action to improve the lives of participants.
Biehl (1998) uses historical case studies spanning the entirety of recorded human 
civilization – both culturally, spatially, and temporally. Within these case studies, she 
explores ecological connections between individual, relational, collective, and natural 
aspects of historical settings. Biehl (1998) makes an excellent case for value-based 
ecological theory, suitable for triangulation with quantitative methodology. Bang (2005) 
has directly observed ecological connections in sustainable villages worldwide, creating 
detailed case studies with subjective and inter-subjective elements spanning over thirty 
years. Bang (2005) not only chronicled the ecological topography of these villages, but 
also permanently immersed himself into the life of an ecovillage. Through this long-term 
exposure and hands-on experience, Bang widened his understanding and description of 
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the settings in focus. Bernard and Young (1997) mixed case studies of sustainable 
communities with GIS data to triangulate their descriptions of ecological connections 
within sites across the United States. Rutter, Mangham, Mortimore, and Ouston (1979, 
cited in Bryman, 1984) conducted an in depth case study of students in schools observing 
the complexities of the students ecology. This study showed that individual schools made 
an enormous impact on objective markers like national exams or delinquency arrests, 
essentially overturning the mega-funded, purely quantitative Coleman report from eleven 
years previous. This illustrates a pragmatic difference as well as the more debated 
epistemological difference: The qualitative report has greater validity from recognizing 
more relevant elements and interactions of the students’ issues than the relatively shallow 
quantitative study. 
Deep qualitative methodology can be based on values and practices that mesh 
well with ecological theory. Taking the time to immerse oneself in the ecological 
topography of an individual, group, setting, or event can make details and connections 
emerge that would otherwise remain obscured. The skills and time necessary to conduct 
worthy deep qualitative research are major drawbacks, as well as its rare use of action 
components to follow up results. Qualitative research also retains a relative lack of 
acceptance in academia – mostly due to its lack of focus on reliability and perceived lack 
of rigor when compared to quantitative methods. Future triangulation of qualitative 
methodology with quantitative measures will hopefully grant a wider acceptance, 
increased reliability, and increased perception of rigor for qualitative research. Even with 
these drawbacks, deep qualitative methodology is central to ecological research. 
61
Behavior Settings Research
According to Ragle, Barker, and Johnson (1978), when measuring a behavior 
setting, one must first determine how to identify, measure and describe the context of 
behaviors. As noted previously, artificial boundaries are useful for determining a space 
and time for measurement of settings and their influential variables. Wicker (1990) 
distills Barker's theory of relationships between behavior settings or nested systems as the 
point when “...different explanatory principles are needed” (p. 129). This explanation 
removes the assumption of discrete settings while retaining the point of difference 
between systems. Once a setting's boundaries are determined, the researcher may begin 
measurement. Barker (1978a) further asserts that there are two problems involved in 
collecting ecological data: One is the data gathering method; the other relates to policies 
and programs followed in establishing and operating a non-experimental, eco-behavioral 
facility. Barker's Midwest Field Station is an excellent example, although determining 
locations and funding for a long term field station would certainly be a challenge for 
community researchers.
Barker (1978b) claims that recording behavioral data is best achieved through 
verbal narrative records by trained observers and by video/audio recording. This type of 
observation is referred to by Barker (1965) as transducer (T) observation. Barker (1965) 
claims that when researchers act as a transducer of data – rather than an operator (O) – 
they do not create the world they are measuring, but rather translate it. As an operator (as 
in laboratory research), the researcher acts within the measured phenomena – potentially 
influencing and constraining it – while also acting as translator of the data. Barker (1965) 
asserts that this method of data collection grants greater control over the research as the 
62
operator partially contrives the process being measured. This contradicts known observer 
effects (many of which have been articulated after Barker [1965]) that evidence the effect 
of all measurement on phenomena being measured. Regardless, T data (i.e., field 
observation) is far more “natural” and ecologically valid than O data (i.e., laboratory 
work) in Barker's (1965) estimation. Participatory action oriented research would 
seemingly fit into O data by its involvement with research phenomena, even though its 
dynamic nature fits best within the T model. Perhaps PAR research is a synthesis of the T 
and O models in which the researcher(s) act within a naturalistic setting to change 
behaviors and outcomes while utilizing T methods to measure outcomes. T data also 
conforms less to the plans of the researcher and therefore is less likely than O data to lead 
to laws of behavior or replicable patterns (Barker, 1965).
The study of behavior settings might lend itself to attempting the engineering of 
“ideal” settings for humans. Reducing the study of human environment and subsequent 
behavior to a continuum of favorable and unfavorable conditions must be avoided, as 
environments have the ability to foster certain characteristics and behaviors at the 
expense of others (Moos, 1973). This consequence should lead community researchers 
and practitioners to carefully weigh the outcomes of particular milieus on its regular and 
predicted inhabitants before analyzing environmental factors or engaging in change 
efforts. These potential consequences can also be avoided by participatory and 
collaborative efforts that dynamically respond to behavioral and community changes 
caused by changing environments – whether due to action research, succession, external 
change, etc. Keeping dynamic maximal demands (Biehl, 1998) as a long term vision of 
ideal elements of a setting while maintaining realistic minimal demands (Biehl, 1998) 
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steeped in the reality of participants and the capabilities of settings can yield greater well-
being for communities and their inhabitants without the negative consequences of 
abstract social engineering.
Participatory Action Research (PAR)
Ecological theory is not only based on the holistic view of object in context, but 
takes energy and power into consideration. Kelly, et al. (2000) note that the ecological 
perspective encourages interventions that promote the creation and facilitation of social 
structures and processes that allow better and more positive interconnectedness – 
essentially an action orientation. Kingry-Westergaard & Kelly (1990) note that, 
“[a]ccording to [the] ecological approach, theoretical propositions are tested, measured, 
and understood by the meaning that the propositions have for the participants who are 
experiencing the phenomenon” (p. 29). This declaration logically leads toward an 
intrinsically participatory nature for ecological methods. This standard is well matched to 
the critical thrust of participatory research, whose core analyses scrutinize the presence 
and movement of power (Cornwall & Jewkes, 1995). The participatory action researcher 
must not only track the changes within the setting’s ecology, but the shifting position of 
the researcher within that ecology and the constantly changing power dynamics between 
all participants (Hesse-Biber, Leavey, & Yaiser, 2004). This makes the action researcher 
a necessary expert on ecological principles to be an effective worker within the dynamic 
relationships of a participatory setting. Initiating community change, especially 
catalyzing an increase in positive social impacts and a decrease in negative social 
impacts, requires a working knowledge of past and current interdependencies with an eye 
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for facilitating new interdependencies (Kelly, et al., 2000). Rapkin and Mulvey (1990) 
remind us that to do ecologically sound research, “[o]ur methods should bring us closer 
to the community” (p. 149). As opposed to many models of inquiry, applying an 
ecological lens to PAR results in the observation of power and relationship starting from 
the bottom of the social hierarchy (Hesse-Biber, Leavey, & Yaiser, 2004). This vantage 
helps to create a complete picture of systems and the complex human transactions within.
Christens and Perkins (2008) suggest that regardless of the rhetoric in CP, most 
community psychology does not allow the community to set the agenda of research. 
Although CP may fall short in this arena, there is a central movement toward 
empowerment in CP – which is a core element of non-tokenistic participation. Rappaport 
(1990) urges us to ask, “...[f]or whose benefit is this research conducted?” (p. 54). By 
adopting participatory lens and adhering to the principals of ecological validity, 
empowerment becomes a central focus. Tricket (1990) adds that, “[u]nless grounded in 
local conditions, empowerment efforts could become another exercise in psychological 
imperialism or the imposing of external and potentially alien ideology” (p. 213). Tying 
these two perspectives together leads to the necessarily interconnected nature of ecology 
and empowerment. Rappaport (1990) also asserts that for researchers with empowerment 
values, the question of benefit, “is as much a part of methodology as the selection of 
measures and data-analytic procedures” (p.54). A contextual, ecological perspective 
allows the researcher to acknowledge and better understand diverse peoples and the 
impact of policies, interventions, etc. on their particular life and context (Trickett, 1990) 
– moving the research process toward more valid empowerment efforts. The 
empowerment lens relates to the second element of the definition of ecological validity in 
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which the researcher analyzes their place in the ecological topography of the research – 
including the place and affect they have on participants. This vantage also leads the 
conscientious researcher toward the promotion of the participants’ well-being.
Prilleltensky (2005) observes that any approach that aims to improve well-being 
must take into account all domains from individual to collective, recognizing the 
temporally dynamic ecology of the intended recipient(s) of enhanced well-being. 
Democratizing the entire research process is one of the major routes to advancing the 
well-being of participants, often starting with encouraging community members to 
participate in creating research questions, gathering data, and local sense-making. 
Increasing participation in the research project not only democratizes the process of 
creating and disseminating knowledge, but also includes aspects of ecological topography 
often excluded such as folk culture and colloquial interpretation (Cornwall & Jewkes, 
1995; Stoecker, 1999). Some PAR also works to organize communities to build or 
expand existing relationships within the ecological topography of the chosen setting 
(Stoecker, 1999). This enhances the sustainability of enhanced well-being, since most 
research projects have a limited time frame in which to work. This makes the 
democratization of power extremely important for skill building and efficacy of 
participants (Nelson & Prilleltensky, 2005).
Maguire (1987) outlines five phases of doing participatory research (adapted from 
Vio Grossi, Martinic, Tapia, and Pascal [1983] and Hall [1975, 1981], as cited in 
Maguire, 1987): a) Organization of the project and knowledge of the working area: This 
consists of gathering information and creating relationships with potential participants. b) 
Definition of generating problematics: This consists of problem-posing dialogues aimed 
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at achieving a deep and critical view of participants’ reality and potential issues. c) 
Objectivization and problematization: This consists of linking the experiences within the 
setting to structural conditions of social reality. Participants are then able to effectively 
understand and state problems within their setting while taking into account ecological 
influences. d) Researching social reality and analyzing collected information: This 
consists of participants using available information and local knowledge to develop 
theories and potential solutions for social transformation. e) Definition of action projects: 
This consists of researchers and participants deciding on what actions to take to address 
the identified problems. This process moves participants from research objects to 
empowered beneficiaries and creators of knowledge.
Although levels of participation and extremity of motivation for social change 
vary from project to project, the phases outlined from Maguire (1987) contain many of 
the common elements found in PAR literature. Rigor of method and research reliability 
do not seem to be the strong points of PAR, often taking a far back seat to theory, 
contextual validity, and values. The methodology of PAR that does emerge from the 
literature is highly congruent with ecological theory, but requires an adherence to values 
that some researchers might find overly self-marginalizing.
Nelson and Prilleltensky (2005) point out that one of the main desires of 
participants in PAR is for the researchers to equalize their power with all involved 
parties. The process of giving up power can create many problems and is potentially 
unlikely – or highly impractical – for many research agreements. Maguire (1987) relayed 
a host of potential drawbacks and problems in conducting PAR, including: The passivity 
of participants, the necessity of a strong value position, the lack of access to financial and 
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institutional resources, the lone (or few) researcher being overwhelmed by the project 
scope, the transfer of project control to participants, identifying and building relationships 
with community members and community based groups, finding a group to voice 
collective problems, community or organizational leadership using the research project as 
a venue to increase their power base, increased knowledge may not lead to increased 
power or action, and most of all, time. PAR seems to have the greatest possibility for 
creating ecologically informed change, but this possibility is balanced by enormous 
amounts of potential drawbacks.
Geographic Information Systems (GIS)
Luke (2005) notes the importance of geographic information systems as a 
contextual method for community researchers. GIS uses spatial mapping to make visual 
comparisons of aggregated individual data (e.g., census data), yielding striking results not 
achievable with any other method. The visual representation of data also provides 
unparalleled means for communicating results to the public and organizations that may 
lack the time or experience necessary for wading through purely numerical results. 
Christens, Hanlin, and Speer (2007) assert that GIS has the ability to visually and flexibly 
display the complexity of a system, leaving space for the natural ambiguity involved in 
power-conscious research and action. Nicotera (2007) also notes that GIS maps have the 
potential to display structural neighborhood characteristics uniquely, although care 
should be taken to mix these results with social indicators to avoid limited understandings 
of neighborhoods.
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GIS maps are commonly used to map crime to determine “hot spots” – and even 
to attempt crime prediction (see Chainey, Tompson, & Uhlig, 2008). Perkins, Larsen, and 
Brown (in press) used GIS to gather the majority of their data and then utilized 
Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) to analyze the data. The GIS map color-coding 
yielded significant and meaningful results that were inaccessible to HLM alone. Coe, 
Gibson, Spencer, and Stuttaford (2008) used GIS along with interviews and PAR 
methods to determine geographic patterns of use of the British “Sure Start” program 
(similar to the U.S. “Head Start” program). They were able to determine locations of 
diminished use of the program to target efforts to understand and encourage program use. 
Especially when used in a mixed-method design, GIS has unique and flexible uses for 
expanding ecological validity and contextual knowledge.
Dynamic Modeling
Early dynamic modeling. After successful careers as an electrical engineer and 
later an organizational/corporate consultant, Jay W. Forrester realized that his values 
required him to utilize his skills for the good of society. Forrester (1969) utilized dynamic 
modeling to understand the problems of urban growth, decay, and renewal. Although the 
technology available at the time was rudimentary, Forrester gained the attention of the 
U.S. Congress with his findings on urban decay cycles. Using the computer dynamic 
modeling program “Dynamo,” Forrester (1969) began the field of social dynamic theory.
Forrester (1975) built on the technical success of his previous dynamic modeling 
by expanding the accompanying theory. Social dynamic theory posited that ecological 
systems (especially urban systems) are too complicated for intuitive decision-making. 
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The first factor of major interest that Forrester (1975) discovered in his simulations was 
counterintuitive ripple effects; when decisions were made in organizations that had 
seemingly predictable results, apparently chaotic outcomes would result. By establishing 
and tracking decision points, within a system, Forrester (1975) was able to predict the 
results of decisions with far greater accuracy than experienced intuition and was then able 
to apply social dynamic theory and computer modeling to numerous organizational, 
community, and political applications.
Contemporary dynamic modeling. Ruth and Hannon (1997) explore dynamic 
modeling in the corporate workplace. Ecological models based on complex computer 
network systems are used to predict organizational change outcomes, market behavior, 
and resource movement. Although using dynamic modeling for profit maximization is 
not necessarily compatible with the values of ecological theory, the modeling methods 
are becoming more accessible to broader audiences (Mcgarvey & Hannon, 2004). Not 
only are the methods for modeling dynamic systems adaptable for ecologically minded 
social scientists, but the organizational change models already in use can be adapted for 
human-services organizations seeking to track and predict shifts congruent with their 
values.
Modern computer-based dynamic models are extremely complicated and difficult 
to keep current; the complexity of the model can leave room for trouble, but as Hannon 
(2001) points out, even the failure of a model points to bottlenecks in a system that can be 
targeted for scrutiny. If model nodes or relationships lag with reality – assuming that 
other elements of the model are functioning properly – one can see where 
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counterintuitive or non-predictable change is happening and focus on tracking the 
specific nuances of the anomalous situation.
One of the main strengths of dynamic modeling is that it can use many different types 
of data to create and elaborate a model; field data, experimental lab data, historical 
examples, policy data, and technological innovations have been used in effective models 
– with many more options available (Breiger, Carley, & Pattison, 2003). Although there 
is never going to be a fully reliable way to judge the impact of a policy on every level of 
an ecosystem or determine all of the factors that contribute to phenomena, dynamic 
modeling provides a promisingly more reliable way to achieve these aims than any other 
quantitative method. Balancing dynamic modeling’s ability to utilize data from almost 
any source is the complexity of the technology, skills, and coordination required to create 
and upkeep an effective model. The necessary elements to include dynamic modeling in 
an ecological research project are beyond the reach of almost all researchers and the 
education required to understand dynamic models – let alone create one – is likely 
distasteful to all but the most dedicated technology users. As the software evolves and the 
methods of measurement evolve, perhaps dynamic modeling will become a more 
common part of social science research.
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CHAPTER VII
EVALUATING COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY RESEARCH
Sampling
The sample is taken from all research articles published from 1998 to 2008 in the 
3 major journals of community psychology: a) The Journal of Community Psychology 
(JCP); b) The American Journal of Community Psychology (AJCP); and c) The Journal 
of Community and Applied Social Psychology (JCASP). These journals represent the 3 
major research outlets for community psychologists. Although the Journal of Rural 
Community Psychology is also listed on the SCRA web site and the Journal of 
Intervention and Prevention in the Community is seen by some in CP as an outlet for 
publishing, neither of these journals has a means of searching titles, keywords, or 
abstracts. Each journal was searched for key ecological terms found in the reviewed 
theoretical and research pieces used to create the instrument. Although the ecological 
analogy is considered central to community psychology, only articles returning 
ecological search terms were sampled, as it would be unfair to judge the ecological 
validity of articles with no claims to the theory or methods. The search terms for the title 
and keyword search were ecolog*, contextual, multilevel, multi-level, transactional, 
interdependence, cycling, adaptation succession, hierarchical linear modeling, 
ethnography, dynamic modeling, participatory action research, and community based 
participatory research. These terms represent the derivations of the word ecology (e.g., 
ecological), alternative terms for ecological (e.g., contextual, multilevel, transactional), 
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the theoretical terms used in Kelly (1968) for ecological processes, and methods known 
to be intrinsically high in ecological validity. The article lists were then corrected to make 
sure that the authors were using the search terms with the same definition as the search 
intended. Articles were then checked to limit the sample to empirical research articles, 
excluding purely theoretical works. Based on similar methodology in Davidson, Evans, 
Ganote, Henrickson, Jacobs-Priebe, Jones, Prilleltensky, and Riemer (2006), 10 articles 
were sampled from each journal (where available): AJCP returned 54 viable articles, of 
which 10 were chosen using a random number generator (random.org); JCP returned only 
10 viable articles, all of which were included; JCASP returned only 6 viable results, all of 
which were included (n = 26 total, see appendix C for a complete list of the sampled 
articles).
The Ecological Validity Instrument
The ecological validity instrument contains matrices with X and Y axes. The 
instrument itself can be found in Appendix B. Although a more detailed approach can be 
used to compute ecological validity scores, such as using a rating scale for each cell, the 
number of articles sampled made such computation prohibitive. Instead, cell content was 
recorded as a binary value and then summed for a total score. The individual patterns of 
values on each sheet are revealing about the depth and breadth of ecological validity, as 
well as trends across research. As a tool for research planning, a more detailed analysis – 
including ratings within each cell – is recommended for a more full understanding of a 
project's potential ecological validity and the means to expand both breadth and depth.
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After constructing the instrument, five independent raters used the instrument to 
rate the same research article. The purpose of this test was to determine the pedagogical 
value of the instrument and its operation. After initial scores were compared, the 
instructions were modified and expanded, re-administered, and compared again. After 
this process, the comparison yielded acceptable levels of comparability with intended 
definitions and results.
Structure of Evaluation: The X Axis
Moving beyond a theoretical framework, the instrument used in this project 
measures the use and application of ecological theory. As both a separate and integrated 
aspect of the assessment, an understanding of ecological principles adapted within this 
paper is evaluated. This is not intended as negatively critical, but to judge both the 
theoretical usefulness of the adaptations and the sophistication of ecological 
understanding in community psychology. The evaluative framework for measuring 
ecological validity examines levels, processes and methods in 4 arenas: a) 
Theory/Conceptualization; b) Measurement of antecedents; c) Action and deliverables; 
and d) Measurement of outcomes/impact. Each arena is explained below with an example 
question. Although not necessarily so, these arenas (represented by X axis columns on 
the instrument) can be seen as temporal: First researchers conceptualize an issue, then 
research details about etiology and current state, then act, intervene, or disseminate, 
followed by post comparisons or systematic observations of effects. Within a larger 
research context, these arenas may happen in cycles or out of sequence.
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Theory/Conceptualization. This refers to the level of ecological awareness of the 
researcher(s), as well as the theory consulted to guide the research process. This is the 
researcher’s understanding and elaboration of the level, process, or method to further 
understand the research phenomenon. This also includes the researcher’s use of this 
understanding to design the research and/or the intervention. This may include the 
literature review, the researcher's synthesis of applicable theory, or the researcher's 
specific plan for the research, action, or intervention. This arena may ask: Do the 
researchers explicate their knowledge of the transactional relationships that may 
influence the research process? 
Measurement of antecedents. This refers to the ecological levels and processes 
that are measured and analyzed prior to and during the initial research process, but before 
any action takes place. This includes the use of archival and existing data, new 
measurement by the researcher, etc. For purely exploratory and explanatory research (i.e., 
most research), this is likely the only measurement that takes place. This arena may ask: 
How far into the ecological topography of the setting of interest do the researchers delve 
to understand and measure causes of a given phenomena? 
Action and deliverables. This refers to the ecological levels and processes that are 
acted upon or leveraged purposefully in the research process, as well as any material 
products created (including research manuscripts, presentations, reports, etc.). This may 
be the full-fledged action component of a PAR project, the publication of a manuscript, 
or any other intentional use of the research process or results. This also includes 
associated and recommended actions where appropriate – as when the researcher is 
evaluating a project, making recommendations as a consultant, or observing phenomena 
75
that they cannot directly influence but about which they wish to raise consciousness. This 
arena may ask: What organizations were involved in the research intervention? What 
venues did the researcher choose to release research results? 
Measurement of outcomes/impact. This refers to the ecological levels and 
processes that are measured to determine the effect(s) of the research process and action. 
This arena may ask: What are the long term effects of the intervention? Are 
community/organizational members’ reactions to the research efforts measured 
effectively? 
Structure of Evaluation: The Y Axes
The Y axes on the instrument represent important ecological components that can 
be observed in each of the 4 validity arenas just outlined. These 3 components are: a) 
Ecological levels (Based on Bronfenbrenner, 1979, expanded for comprehensiveness); b) 
Ecological processes (Based on Kelly, 1968, expanded for comprehensiveness); and c) 
Ecological methods (Based on Shinn & Rapkin, 2000, expanded for comprehensiveness).
Levels of ecology. Each level represents a discrete but interacting level of the 
ecological topography. The 6 levels are:
1. Demo-system: This is the individual level, including intrapsychic phenomena 
(motivations, emotions, individual behavior, neural processes, etc.).
2. Micro-system: This is the interpersonal level, including organizational teams, 
family phenomena, and immediate environments.
76
3. Meso-system: This level involves multiple micro-systems and their connections, 
like school, home, and work connections/networks. This includes block-level and 
small neighborhood interactions.
4. Exo-system: This level is the traditional community, including all the major 
interactions for a definable group and/or place. This may include large 
neighborhoods, towns, etc.
5. Macro-system: This level includes the cultural, societal, and political context for 
the community and its content.
6. Geo-system: This level represents the inhabited globe, spanning global processes 
like the global economy, global climate change, international politics, etc.
Ecological processes. As outlined previously in this paper, the ecological 
processes are based on natural ecological principles that have been adapted by Kelly 
(1968) and myself for use in human and community contexts. The 7 processes are 
summarized below:
1. Interdependence: This represents the ecological connections between levels, 
people, organizations, etc., making up the basis of holistic thinking. This can also 
include power relationships between stakeholders, researchers, organization 
workers, politicians, etc.
2. Adaptation: This means that units of analysis at each ecological level learn and 
adapt to dynamic context (i.e. learning organizations, education, organizing 
efforts, etc.). This can be represented by understanding the adaptation happening 
in a context or the need to initiate or encourage adaptation in stagnant people, 
organizations, etc. 
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3. Succession: This represents the evolution of settings over time. This may be 
closed processes of change or external disturbances from external sources. This 
can be seen in processes of urban decay and renewal, as well as interventions to 
catalyze renewal.
4. Cycling: Modeled after the first law of energy and the law of conservation of 
matter (Energy and matter can neither be created nor destroyed), cycling follows 
the flow of currency, other resources, populations pushed out of neighborhoods, 
use and abuse of time, etc.
5. Entropy: Modeled after the second law of energy (Transfer of energy reduces the 
quality of energy), the entropy tax represents the degrading of energy and 
resources as they transfer through systems, organizations, etc. This can be seen as 
the decay of funding as it passes through organizations, the diffusion of 
responsibility and motivation through meetings, etc.
6. Centripetal versus Centrifugal focus (inward versus outward focus): This 
represents conservation and use of existing and internal resources versus a focus 
on unlimited growth and external solutions and resources to solve issues. 
Centripetal strategies include decentralization of processes, focusing on existing 
strengths and retooling of existing resources. Non-ecologically valid centrifugal 
strategies include using exterior technical strategies, centralized power and 
solutions, unlimited growth, externalizing costs of issues, deficit addressing 
programs, etc.
7. Diversity versus Homogeneity: This represents the celebration and cultivation of 
diversity over conformity and monocultures. This can be diversity of individuals 
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within a setting, research methods and methodology, culture, diversity of ideas, 
tailored solutions for individual contexts, etc.
Methods. These method categories are adapted from theory and research 
consulted for this paper, as well as specific terminology and concepts from Shinn and 
Rapkin (2000). The first category is temporal representation; this represents the 
recognition of temporal changes at a basic level. This element of ecological validity is 
satisfied by pre/post analysis, measuring longitudinally, retrospective research, time-
series analysis, interrupted time-series analysis, dynamic modeling, long-term qualitative 
analysis, ethnography, etc. Temporal representation is a separate category that can be co-
occurring with all other categories.
The next 4 categories represent the research's level of analysis. These levels 
represent scaled increments in analysis that subsume the previous level(s) of analysis 
(e.g., multi-level analyses contain within-level analyses):
1. Within-level analysis: Within-level research (Shinn & Rapkin, 2000) is conducted 
on a single level of analysis, generally the individual level. This includes 
measurement at only one ecological level, e.g., using aggregated questionnaires or 
individual clinical case studies to understand individual behavior.
2. Multi-level analysis: Multi-level research (adapted from Shinn & Rapkin, 2000) 
concerns work conducted on a single level of analysis that replicates or 
generalizes at two levels or more and/or measurement at two or more levels not 
linked by analysis. This includes the effective generalization of aggregated data at 
the organizational level (e.g., organizational climate) and/or the combination of 
79
multiple single-level analyses (e.g., using census block data with interviews to 
understand the experience of poverty).
3. Cross-level analysis: Cross-level research (Shinn & Rapkin, 2000) includes the 
use of analyses that systematically measure (rather than only theorizing) the 
relationships within and across multiple levels. This includes qualitative and 
quantitative approaches like HLM (using qualitative and/or quantitative data), 
multi-level network analysis, brief ethnography, etc.
4. Trans-level analysis: Trans-level research includes analyses that systematically 
measure the relationships within and across multiple levels over time, sufficient 
enough to measure stable patterns and dynamic change. This may include time 
series HLM, dynamic modeling, dynamic network analysis at multiple levels, 
ethnography, behavior settings research in tandem with higher nested level 
analyses, as well as many combinations of temporally sensitive mixed method 
research designs.
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CHAPTER VIII
RESULTS
The results of this research are mostly descriptive (including direct correlations), 
as there are no data to compare against and the small sample size limits statistical 
analyses. Thus, the results consist of summed frequencies, percentages, and central 
tendencies for the purpose of determining the intersection of the research arenas with 
levels, processes, and methods that are especially well represented or underrepresented in 
the sample. Also, several correlations are included to highlight trends in the data and 
relationships between established and new concepts. Finally, differences in ecological 
validity across the different journals are reported.
Following are tables depicting the tallied scores from all of the sampled research 
combined. Each cell represents the percentage of the possible score to indicate how much 
of the potential ecological validity has been achieved. Also, frequencies are reported in 
parentheses – with a total possible score of 26 (except where noted). Each column and 
row has also been summed.
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Levels
Levels of Ecological Topography in the Research Process
Level Theory Measurement 
of 
antecedents
Action & 
deliverables
Measurement 
of outcomes/ 
impact
Level Totals
1. Demo-
system
100%
(26/26)
100%
(26/26)
34.62%
(9/26)
23.08%
(6/26)
64.42%
(67/104)
2. Micro-
system
69.23%
(18/26)
65.38%
(17/26)
0%
(0/26)
0%
(0/26)
33.65%
(35/104)
3. Meso-
system
96.15%
(25/26)
96.15%
(25/26)
30.77%
(8/26)
19.23%
(5/26)
60.58%
(63/104)
4. Exo-
system
88.46%
(23/26)
69.23%
(18/26)
100%
(26/26)
7.69%
(2/26)
66.35%
(69/104)
5. Macro-
system
46.15%
(12/26)
19.23%
(5/26)
3.85%
(1/26)
0%
(0/26)
17.31%
(18/104)
6. Geo-
system
11.54%
(3/26)
3.85%
(1/26)
3.85%
(1/26)
0%
(0/26)
4.81%
(5/104)
Arena 
Totals
68.59%
(107/156)
58.97%
(92/156)
28.85%
(45/156)
8.33%
(13/156)
Matrix 
Total: 
41.19%
(257/624)
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Processes
Ecological Processes
Process Theory Measurement 
of 
antecedents
Action & 
deliverables
Measurement 
of outcomes/ 
impact
Process 
Totals
Interdepen-
dence
100%
(26/26)
100%
(26/26)
34.62%
(9/26)
15.38%
(4/26)
62.5%
(65/104)
Adaptation 96.15%
(25/26)
88.46%
(23/26)
30.77%
(8/26)
19.23%
(5/26)
58.65%
(61/104)
Succession 38.46%
(10/26)
19.23%
(5/26)
7.69%
(2/26)
3.85%
(1/26)
17.31%
(18/104)
Cycling 84.62%
(22/26)
65.38%
(17/26)
23.08%
(6/26)
11.54%
(3/26)
46.15%
(48/104)
Entropy 7.69%
(2/26)
3.85%
(1/26)
3.85%
(1/26)
3.85%
(1/26)
4.81%
(5/104)
Centripetal/
Centrifugal
84.62%
(22/26)
69.23%
(18/26)
30.77%
(8/26)
19.23%
(5/26)
50.96%
(53/104)
Diversity/ 
Homogeneity
100%
(26/26)
100%
(26/26)
34.62%
(9/26)
11.54%
(3/26)
61.54%
(64/104)
Arena 
Totals
73.08%
(133/182)
63.74%
(116/182)
23.63%
(43/182)
12.09%
(22/182)
Matrix 
Total: 
43.13%
(314/728)
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Methods
Methods Used and Consulted in the Research Process
Method Theory Measurement 
of 
antecedents
Action & 
deliverables
Measurement 
of outcomes/ 
impact
Method 
Totals
Temporal 
representa-
tion
84.62%
(22/26)
50.%
(13/26)
23.08%
(6/26)
11.54%
(3/26)
42.31%
(44/104)
Within-level 
analysis
100%
(26/26)
100%
(26/26)
100%
(26/26)
23.08%
(6/26)
80.77%
(84/104)
Multi-level 
analysis
100%
(26/26)
96.15%
(25/26)
26.92%
(7/26)
15.38%
(4/26)
59.62%
(62/104)
Cross-level 
analysis
76.08%
(19/26)
69.23%
(18/26)
7.69%
(2/26)
3.85%
(1/26)
38.46%
(40/104)
Trans-level 
analysis
23.08%
(6/26)
7.69%
(2/26)
3.85%
(1/26)
3.85%
(1/26)
9.62%
(10/104)
Arena 
Totals
76.15%
(99/130)
64.62%
(84/130)
32.31%
(42/130)
11.54%
(15/130)
Matrix 
Total: 
46.15%
(240/520)
Comparisons and Correlations
Additional frequencies were tallied based on exploratory questions and 
correlations were run based on these frequencies. The comparisons and correlations are 
based on the following questions: a) How do scores compare between original levels 
outlined in Bronfenbrenner (1979) versus levels added for this paper? b) How do scores 
compare between original processes outlined in Kelly (1968) versus processes added for 
this paper? c) How do scores compare between more traditional research arenas (Theory/ 
conceptualization and measurement of antecedents) versus action oriented research 
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arenas (Action/deliverables and measurement of outcomes/impact)? d) How do scores on 
the 3 matrices (Levels, processes, and methods) compare to each other? 
Comparisons and Correlations
Variable Percentage/
Frequency
Correlation
(Spearman's Rho)
Significance
(2-tailed)
Bronfenbrenner's 
(1979) Levels
44.47%
(185/416)
New Levels 34.62%
(72/208)
.518** p = .007
Kelly's (1968) 
Processes
46.15%
(144/312)
New Processes 39.1%
(122/312)
.620** p = .001
Traditional 
Research
67.41%
(631/936)
Action Oriented 
Research
19.23%
(180/936)
.272 p = .179
Levels 41.19%
(257/624)
Lev. X Proc. = .610**
Level X Meth. = .591**
p = .001
p = .001
Processes 43.13%
(314/728)
Proc. X Lev. = .591**
Proc. X Meth. = .698**
p = .001
p = .000
Methods 46.15%
(240/520)
Meth. X Lev. = .591**
Meth. X Proc. = .698**
p = .001
p = .000
Representation of Ecological Validity Elements
In an effort to determine which elements of ecological validity are 
overrepresented or underrepresented in the sampled community psychology research, 
cells of data with scores outside of 1 standard deviation were gathered. The sample of 26 
articles (m = 11.26, sd = 9.82) with 72 total cells has a total of 14 cells below 1 standard 
deviation and 20 cells above 1 standard deviation. Although an arbitrary margin would 
85
reveal many more elements underrepresented in the sampled research (and fewer 
overrepresented), calculating the SD is more driven by the data. 
Representation of Ecological Elements by Standard Deviation
Below 1 SD (<1.44) Above 1 SD (>21.08)
Micro-level: 
Action/Deliverables
Demo-level: 
Theory/Conceptualization
Cycling:
Theory/Conceptualization
Micro-level: Measurement 
of Outcomes
Demo-level: Measurement of 
Antecedents
Centripetal/Centrifugal:
Theory/Conceptualization
Macro-level: 
Action/Deliverables
Meso-level: 
Theory/Conceptualization
Diversity/Homogeneity:
Theory/Conceptualization
Macro-level: Measurement 
of Outcomes
Meso-level: Measurement of 
Antecedents
Diversity/Homogeneity: 
Measurement of 
Antecedents
Geo-level: Measurement of 
Antecedents
Exo-level: 
Theory/Conceptualization
Temporal Representation:
Theory/Conceptualization
Geo-level: 
Action/Deliverables
Exo-level: 
Action/Deliverables
Within-level Methods:
Theory/Conceptualization
Geo-level: Measurement of 
Outcomes
Interdependence: 
Theory/Conceptualization
Within-level Methods:
Measurement of 
Antecedents
Succession: Measurement 
of Outcomes
Interdependence: 
Measurement of Antecedents
Within-level Methods:
Action/Deliverables
Entropy: Measurement of 
Antecedents
Adaptation:
Theory/Conceptualization
Multi-level Methods:
Theory/Conceptualization
Entropy: 
Action/Deliverables
Adaptation: Measurement of 
Antecedents
Multi-level Methods:
Measurement of 
Antecedents
Entropy: Measurement of 
Outcomes
Cross-level Methods: 
Measurement of Outcomes
Trans-level Methods: 
Action/Deliverables
Trans-level Methods: 
Measurement of Outcomes
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Between-Journal Comparisons 
Sampling and analysis yielded meaningful contrasts between the three sampled 
journals. As noted previously, sampling had varying degrees of success across the chosen 
journals; the American Journal of Community Psychology returned 54 articles, the 
Journal of Community Psychology returned 10 articles, and the Journal of Community 
and Applied Social Psychology returned only 6 articles. This indicates five times as many 
ecologically oriented articles in AJCP than JCASP. This may be due to trends in editing, 
the lack of focus on ecological theory and methods in applied social psychology, 
differences between domestic and international research, or percentage of research 
articles compared to theoretical articles in each journal. Interestingly, the means for total 
ecological validity for each journal tell a different story; AJCP (M = 28.40, SD = 5.70) 
and JCP (M = 29.40, SD = 9.03) had similar means, while JCASP (M = 39.5, SD = 12.01) 
had a much higher mean. To further explore differences between journal scores, I ran an 
analysis of Variance (ANOVA) after testing for homogeneity of variance using Levene’s 
statistic (2,23) = 2.229, p = .130, indicating acceptable homogeneity. The main effect of 
an ANOVA is barely significant F(2, 23) = 3.444, p = .049 and the most forgiving post 
hoc test (Gabriel) had no significant results, p = .991 for the AJCP comparison with JCP, 
p = .059 for the AJCP comparison with JCASP, and p = .095 for the JCP comparison 
with JCASP. Considering the descriptive differences between means, the lack of 
significance in the post hoc tests is likely due to high variance. 
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CHAPTER IX
DISCUSSION
Caveats
Although much effort has gone into the creation of this instrument, an ecological 
analysis would not be complete without understanding the ecology of published research 
articles. As mentioned previously, it is understood that publishing ecologically valid 
research has been devalued compared to more positivistic and traditional research. Also, 
a single article is often compressed due to publishing constraints and doubtlessly does not 
represent the entire conceptualization by the researcher(s). The methods and results are 
likely better represented than the theoretical orientation and conceptualization. The article 
may also represent one piece of a larger mosaic (across the project or over time) of 
research that has greater ecological validity than the sole published article. Additionally, 
satisfactory adherence to all elements of ecological validity is nearly impossible (and 
such a goal is not assumed). Such validity is likely only attained through collaboration 
over time with other researchers and community members – as well as through dialectics 
within research guilds and across fields. And, as mentioned previously, each cell can 
represent varied use and/or measurement of a concept. A concept may be theorized or 
measured with many differing magnitudes – from minimal effort to complete devotion – 
and still be credited. This means that research articles with the same score may represent 
varied actual levels of ecological validity.
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It is also important to note that some cells are fully populated due to the act of 
publishing research findings – which each article has obviously done. By disseminating 
research to the academic community, each research piece was given credit for action at 
the exo-level. This inflates the score for the exo-level total and for action in general, but 
disseminating research must be included as a viable action – albeit a limited one. 
Publishing research also gets marks for within-level action, as publication is a method of 
action that affects the research community. This means that the within-level total is 
higher than if publication were not counted.
Levels
The totals for focus on elements of ecological validity by levels displays distinct 
favor for certain levels over others; the highest score is for the exo-system (66.35%), 
although this is partially due to credit for publishing – without which the percentage of 
potential ecological validity would drop to 41.3%. Second is the demo-system (64.42%), 
which supports claims that community psychologists still significantly focus on the 
individual level. Next highest is the meso-system (60.58%), where organizational and 
institutional work is conducted. These three levels are considerably more researched than 
any other level. These results paint a picture of community psychologists primarily 
focusing on the individual level and organizations. 
Family systems and teams at the micro-system level fare in the mid to low-range 
of ecological validity (33.65%). This level seemed often skipped in favor of a 
dichotomous model of individual-in-organization, individual-in-community, or 
individual-in-society. The macro-system was conceptualized to less than half of its 
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potential and was rarely included in other arenas. This may be due to lack of focus on 
societal factors in community psychology – although the distinct drop from 
conceptualization to measurement and action points to a lack of priority, skill, or some 
other factor(s), rather than purely a lack of focus on the importance of macro-level 
influences. The geo-level is almost absent from the research, which is expected 
considering the lack of environmental focus in CP. Although (as noted earlier) this is 
changing, the sample displays an almost total lack of acceptance of the influence of 
natural forces and processes on community or individual well-being. 
The lack of focus on the geo-level may occur because the biosphere is so rarely 
mentioned in CP literature (see Levine, Perkins, & Perkins, 2005 for a notable, albeit 
brief exception). To lend construct validity to the levels added for this analysis, 
Bronfenbrenner's (1979) well-known levels were compared with the added demo-level 
and geo-level. These new levels displayed a medium-high correlation (.518, p = .007) 
with existing levels, indicating that ecologically minded researchers tended to focus on 
raising ecological validity across all levels, albeit less so at the geo-level.
Of particular note, action and measurement of impact were particularly low 
(below 1 standard deviation [SD]) for the micro, macro, and geo levels; this indicates that 
action and the measurement of its effects are conspicuously missing from families, teams, 
government, societies, and the natural environment – although action doesn't fare well 
throughout. Additionally, measurement of antecedents was below 1 SD at the geo-level.
On a potentially positive note, theory and conceptualization at the demo, meso, 
and exo levels scored more than 1 SD above the mean, as well as measurement of 
antecedents at the demo and meso levels. Action at the exo-level also scored above 1 SD 
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due to publication. These scores can be seen as a strength of CP research, but an 
alternative should be explored; with limited resources, should CP be focusing so heavily 
on elements of the ecology in research that are already overrepresented by mainstream 
psychologists? Perhaps community psychologists would be ecologically better balanced 
by focusing less on the demo-level and more on other levels of a system's ecology.
Processes
Kelly, et al. (2000) note that interdependence is the conceptual cornerstone of 
ecological thinking. Not surprisingly, interdependence achieved the highest score 
(62.5%) followed closely by diversity versus homogeneity (61.54%). This indicates that 
ecologically oriented research in CP has a solid grasp on interdependence, as well as the 
need for the fostering and celebration of diversity in communities, research, and 
individuals. Adherence to interdependence and diversity versus homogeneity also 
garnered scores above 1 SD in the arenas of theory and measurement of antecedents. 
These scores point toward the accepted importance of one of the processes added for this 
analysis; adherence to Kelly's (1968) processes correlate at a medium-high level (.620, 
p = .001) with adherence to the processes added for this analysis – excluding cycling 
which is a combination of Kelly's (1968) cycling of resources and additional concepts. 
Again, this correlation adds construct validity to the added elements.
Adaptation garnered solid adherence (58.65%) as an element of ecological 
validity in the sampled research, which is expected due to CP's focus on the balance 
between individuals adapting to systems versus fostering and creating niches in systems 
for individuals. Adherence to the concept of adaptation also scored above 1 SD in the 
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arenas of theory and measurement of antecedents. Although systems change is not as 
common as advertised in CP, it still remains a priority that is evidenced by a focus on 
understanding the process of adaptation.
About half of the ecological validity potential for cycling (46.15%) and 
centripetal versus centrifugal focus (50.96%) was fulfilled. Although much of the content 
contained within the cycling process has been present in CP research since Kelly (1968), 
understanding, measurement, and action relating to energy and resource flows was lower 
than the other “traditional” ecological processes. Still, the conceptualization of these two 
processes fell above the 1 SD mark. Linked with the higher level of focus on 
interdependence, this may mean that community psychologists generally understand the 
existence and necessity of networks, but lack a complete understanding of how resources 
and energy move through these networks. This is congruent with the similar score for 
centripetal versus centrifugal focus, as understanding internal, contextual, efficiency-
based solutions to community problems goes hand in hand with understanding resource 
flows. Still, these scores show a high enough level of focus to show that CP is moving in 
the right direction, especially in the arena of theory and conceptualization.
Succession (17.31%) and entropy (4.81%) were severely underrepresented in the 
sampled literature. These processes are also related, as entropy can be seen in the 
evolution of settings (succession); the process of entropy can appear as urban decay, but 
may also be seen as entropy in other levels of an ecology caused by urban renewal on 
other levels. The measurement of antecedents, action, and measurement of impact arenas 
for entropy also fell below the threshold of 1 SD – as did the measurement of impact  
arena for succession. The general lack of focus on action in the sampled research is 
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congruent with a lack of focus on succession, as understanding the prevailing evolution 
and the disturbance(s) necessary to change trends in settings are necessary precursors to 
successful community action.
Methods
Less than half (42.31%) of the ecological potential for a basic level of temporal  
representation was reached by the sampled research. Only half (50.%) of the research 
measured antecedents with a basic level of temporal methods. Interestingly, theory and 
conceptualization for temporal representation scored above 1 SD – even though the total 
scores were moderate at best. This means that half of community psychology research 
does not provide evidence for change over time at any level of the setting or for its 
inhabitants – set in tension against a very high level of temporal theorizing. This indicates 
a lack of methodological knowledge, since community psychology researchers are highly 
conscious of the importance of temporal representation but do not measure it half of the 
time. Obviously, without a basic level of measurement, it is impossible to build toward 
understanding dynamic patterns necessary for trans-level research.
As each increase in level of method(s) subsumes the previous level(s), it is 
inevitable that within-level research would have the highest adherence, followed by each 
higher level in sequence. The meaningful part of the results is the difference in earned 
potential of ecological validity for each level. Within-level research (bolstered by the 
action column's scores for publishing) garners a very high level of adherence (80.77%), 
scoring higher than 1 SD for theory/conceptualization, measurement of antecedents, and 
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action. This is predictable, since within-level methods are extremely basic research and 
are necessary to claim any research method at all. 
Beyond basic methods, almost all (96.15%) of the sampled research conducted 
multi-level research methods, even though total adherence to this level is  more moderate 
(59.62%). Multi-level adherence also scored above 1 SD in both theory/conceptualization 
and measurement of antecedents. Such multi-level comparisons are the beginning of 
understanding the ecology of phenomena, thus, high adherence is a sign of basic 
ecological research.
Cross-level analyses, as advanced by Shinn and Rapkin (2000), had an overall 
adherence level of 38.46%, although 76.08% of research theorized about cross-level 
measurement and 69.23% performed some cross-level method. This means that a 
surprisingly high amount of community psychology research is operating within the 
category of cross-level methods, even though cross-level action and measurement of 
outcomes is quite low; in particular, cross-level measurement of outcomes scored below 
1 SD. This is congruent with the overall disparity of ecological validity between more 
traditional research and action oriented work. This may also point to a lack of training or 
knowledge in how to carry out action across multiple levels; such a significant drop from 
theory and measurement of antecedents to action and measurement of outcomes indicates 
that something more significant than a mere disconnect is at work.
As expected, trans-level analysis scored relatively low on ecological validity 
adherence (9.62%). Considering the time, relationships, coordination, and skills required 
to carry out such research, it is not surprising that only 7.69% of the research did any 
measurement using trans-level methods. Additionally, action and measurement of  
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outcomes for trans-level methods scored below 1 SD. It is more surprising that only 
23.08% of the research sample even theorized about trans-level measurement. Barker 
(1963) notes the difficulty in establishing patterns within a system over time, but 
emphasizes its importance for understanding settings. Also, without even conceptualizing 
systems' dynamic and cross-level nature over time, the likelihood of developing means of 
effectively measuring such patterns are quite unlikely.
The Big Picture
Total adherence to ecological validity is 43.32%. Although this figure represents 
less than half of potential adherence, it is high enough to indicate a commitment by 
community psychologists to ecological validity. This is bolstered by the rate of theory 
and conceptualization within the sampled research, which totaled 72.44%. This generally 
indicates a need for training in following through with the ecological analogy, rather than 
only providing what Shinn (1990) refers to as “lip service” (p. 126). 
Comparing adherence to ecological validity across the matrices shows that all 
three major categories seem to share similar levels of fidelity; levels (41.19%), processes 
(43.13%), and methods (46.15%) all fall within 9% below half of the potential scores. 
Additionally, the construct validity of the instrument, especially its inclusion of the 3 
major categories, is supported by the similarity of adherence across matrices; levels and 
processes correlate at a medium-high level (.610, p = .001), levels and methods also 
correlate at a medium-high level (.591, p = .001), while processes and methods correlate 
at a high level (.698, p = .000). It is important to note that each matrix may have different 
conceptual or ecological value, but the relative similarity of scores across the matrices 
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and correlations between them indicates that one conceptual group is not favored over the 
others.
The data portray a general lack of focus on change and measurement of its 
impact; While 67.41% of potential ecological validity was achieved in the traditional 
research arenas of theory/conceptualization and the measurement of antecedents, only 
19.23% of potential ecological validity was achieved in the action and measurement of  
impact arenas. Even if research is designed to inform interventions or practice rather than 
carry them out, documenting the success of interventions and practice should be more 
prevalent in community psychology literature. It is also interesting that these two pairs of 
research arenas do not correlate (.272, p = .179). Kelly, et al. (2000) state that action is an 
essential element of ecological validity, but this lack of correlation means that 
connections between ecological thinking as input and the resultant action as output are 
not recognized by community psychology researchers. Perhaps making a strong case for 
action as an essential element of ecological validity may guide CP toward further action 
in their research.
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CHAPTER X
CONCLUSION
Ecological theory is a useful guide that has enriched contemporary social science 
research. Because of its far-reaching applications and implications, it is difficult – if not 
impossible – to separate ecological theory from its associated values. Most proponents of 
ecological theory – although aware of their values – do not use theory to push specific 
value orientations, instead attempting to level the playing field of power so that all values 
have a chance to be heard in the debate. Still, the values of the researcher play an 
important role in the research process, especially if the goal is to inform action. Arne 
Naess asserts that, “[o]bjective science cannot provide principles for action (1976/1989, 
p. 40).” Ecological theory seems to demand action and by definition defies the idea of 
objectivity.
Community psychology has accepted the ecological analogy as a core tenet of its 
guiding principles. The results of this research show that there is already a strong base of 
ecological validity in community psychology research but there is much room for 
improvement. The path from our current base to strong methodology and action seems to 
lie in a resurgence of ecological thinking, training in ecological methods, and – what I 
hope I have provided – a detailed guide to raising the level of ecological validity in 
community research. The values of our field often reject positivism and its related 
concepts (e.g., validity and reliability), but retooling the concept of validity in the image 
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of ecological research and action seems a worthy effort that avoids throwing out the 
validity baby with the positivist bathwater.
Perhaps when being guided by a theory that has strong related values, it is even 
more important to test the theory and establish frameworks for its adherence. Ecological 
theory has the potential to be tested through direct means, through the triangulation of 
multiple methods, and through the systematic measurement of adherence to its tenets – 
essentially ecological validity. Although some may feel that such testing clutters the path 
for value-based action, it actually adds legitimacy and explores the nuances of ecological 
theory, keeping it as alive as the phenomena that it observes. This process not only 
supports and legitimizes ecological theory, but also paves the way for effective and 
congruent theory-based methodology for research and action.
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Appendix B
Ecological Validity Instrument
Author(s): Year: Journal: AJCP JCP JCASP
Levels of Ecological Topography in the Research Process
Theory/Conceptualization Measurement 
of antecedents
Action & de-
liverables
Measurement of out-
comes/impact
1. Demo-system
2. Micro-system
3. Meso-system
4. Exo-system
5. Macro-system
6. Geo-system
Ecological Processes
Theory/Conceptualization Measurement 
of antecedents
Action & de-
liverables
Measurement of out-
comes/impact
Interdependence
Adaptation
Succession
Cycling
Entropy
Centripetal/
Centrifugal
Diversity/
Homogeneity
Methods Used and Consulted in the Research Process
Theory/Conceptualization Measurement 
of antecedents
Action & de-
liverables
Measurement of out-
comes/impact
Temporal represent.
Within-level analysis
Multi-level analysis
Cross-level analysis
Trans-level analysis
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